The Great Credit Contraction:  Who, What, When, Where and Why by Harrell, Alvin C.
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 4 Summer 2010 Article 7
March 2012
The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When,
Where and Why
Alvin C. Harrell
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alvin C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When, Where and Why, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss4/7
THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION: WHO,
WHAT, WHEN, WHERE AND WHY
Alvin C. Harrell*
INTRODUCTION
By now nearly everyone knows that the heart of the current
problems in our economy is too little credit, not too much.' A salient
feature of our current economic crisis is the transition from the credit
boom years of 1993-2006, to the credit bust beginning in roughly
2007 and continuing to the present, a period referred to here as the
"Great Credit Contraction."2 This stands in contrast to much of the
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. Professor Harrell is the Editor of
the Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report.
1. See Michael R. Crittenden & Marshall Eckblad, Lending Falls at Epic Pace, WALL ST. J., Feb.
24, 2010 at A1; S. Mitra Kalita, Beyond the Bubble: The 'Democratization of Credit'Is Over-Now It's
Payback Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at Al; David Streitfeld, Rates Are Low, But Banks Balk at
Refinancing, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2009; Nick Timiraos, Borrowers Pass Up Mortgage Windfall, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 3, 2010, at Al. Importantly, this has not prevented the advancement of legislation and
regulation designed to reduce credit availability even further. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary,
The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 140 (2009);
infra Parts H1 and III.
2. See Kalita, supra note 1. Some have referred to it as The Great Recession. See Justin Lahart,
Currents, The Great Recession: A Downturn Sized Up-Unemployment Lines Have Been Long Before,
but No Prior Slump Since World War II Has Hurt So Much on So Many Fronts, WALL ST. J., July 28,
2009, at A12; Mortimer Zuckerman, The Great Recession Continues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2010, at
A19. At this point, some have also declared the recession over, but to others that seems overly
optimistic. See Associated Press, At Last the Recession Is Over-What Now?, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 30,
2009, at 3B; Associated Press, Higher Jobless Rates Could Be New Normal, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 20,
2009, at B 1; Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Break Record, USA TODAY, July 16, 2009, at 3B; Alan S.
Blinder, The Economy Has Hit Bottom, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at AI5 (noting that the bottom of a
recession is not the same as a recovery); Jon Hilsenrath & Deborah Solomon, Job Cuts Outpace GDP
Fall-Break from Historical Pattern Suggests That Unemployment Could Weigh on Recovery, WALL
ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A3; Jim Kuhnhenn, Jobless Rate Becomes Obama's New Reality, OKLAHOMAN,
Nov. 7, 2009, at 3C ("At 10.2 percent ... unemployment [has] climbed to chart-topping heights unseen
in more than a quarter century .... [M]ore than 15 million Americans are out of work and 3.5 million
lost their jobs while Obama was president."); Amy Merrick & Conor Dougherty, Plunging Revenue
Squeezes State Budgets Further, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2009, at A3; Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Sees Slow
Recovery as Skittish Consumers Cut Back, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2009, at A2; see also Ruth Simon,
Foreclosure Rescue Still Bogged Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at A9; The Year in Foreclosures,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A20 (noting that the foreclosure crisis continues "[e]ven with broad
government support for housing..."). Clearly, something has gone awry. See, e.g., Associated Press,
Stimulus-Related Jobs Don't Add Up in Report, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 29, 2009, at 3B; Liam Denning,
U.S. 's Grossly Distorted Product, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at CIO; David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick,
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academic commentary and public policy initiatives of recent years,
which often have focused on the need to restrain credit availability.
3
The result is a disconnect between public policy and economic needs
that is contributing to the crisis. This article explores this disconnect
in the context of the Great Credit Contraction, including the relation
between consumer protection law, credit availability, and economic
growth (or recession), with consideration given to the ways that
misguided legal initiatives may have unintended consequences which
contribute to economic volatility and distress.
This article seeks to avoid two analytical weaknesses that seem
prevalent in the literature on these issues. One is essentially a lack of
analysis-a tendency to describe what happened without explaining
how or why. More than one presentation and article have been billed
Loans Shrink as Fear Lingers-Porfolios at Big Banks Fall 2.8% in Last Quarter, WALL ST. J., July 27,
2009, at A]; Edward P. Lazear, Stimulus and the Jobless Recovery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2009, at Al9;
Don Mecoy, Economist Calls Recovery 'Half-Baked,' OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 24, 2010, at 4B; Sara Murray,
As Retail Sales Climb, Consumers Stay Glum, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2010, at A2 (noting decline in the
consumer-sentiment index); Peggy Noonan, Declarations, We're Governed by Callous Children, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at Al9 ("[N]o one has any faith in [the government] numbers."); Liz Rappaport &
Serena Ng, Lending Squeeze Drags On, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2009, at Al; see also Mortimer
Zuckerman, Op-Ed., The Economy Is Even Worse Than You Think, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A13;
Streitfeld, supra note 1. As noted in this article, among the reasons for these problems is the Great
Credit Contraction.
3. See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41
CONN. L. REv. 1257 (2009). Compare Harrell, supra note 1, with Todd Zyuicki, Complex Loans Didn't
Cause the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2010, at A15. For examples of recent legislation and
regulatory initiatives that discourage the availability of consumer credit, see id.; Richard E. Gottlieb &
Andrew J. McGuinness, Subprime Lending as a Public Nuisance: Casting Blame Mortgage on Lenders
and Wall Street for Inner City Blight, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4 (2008); Stephen F.J. Ornstein et
al., The Current Residential Mortgage Market Landscape in the United States, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 891 (2007); Janet Frank, Summary of Banking Regulatory Guidelines for Home Mortgage Lending,
61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 154 (2007); infra Part I.B.7. See also Gary Fields, Vermont Mortgage
Laws Shut the Door on Bust and Boom, WALL ST. J, Aug. 18, 2009, at Al (noting that Vermont's strict
consumer protection laws "[keep] some Vermonters ... from buying homes."). The restraints on private
credit have continued to increase even as direct federal credit subsidies have increased, creating a split
personality in credit policy that discourages private credit availability even as public funding has
increased. See infra Parts 11-Ill; Editorial, The Fannie Mae Dice Roll Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. I1,
2009, at A20 (describing federal subsidies for residential mortgage credit); Henry Kaufinan, The Real
Threat to Fed Independence, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A21 (noting the recent increase in the
Federal Reserve Board's balance sheet to $2.2 trillion, including more than $1 trillion of long-term
mortgage-related securities). Not surprisingly, this has resulted in the effective nationalization of the
mortgage finance industry, with roughly 90% of mortgage lending being funded by the federal
government and the private mortgage market "all but erased." The Fannie Mae Dice Roll Continues,
supra; see also, Peter Eavis, Uncle Sam Bets the House on Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2009, at
C2; infra Parts H1-Ill.
1210 [Vol. 26:4
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
in essence as explaining how and why the current credit crisis
happened, only to present a factual recitation of the relevant events
(Lehman Brothers failed, private credit declined, housing values
collapsed, foreclosures soared, etc.) without any explanation of the
cause and effect relationships responsible for those events. Yet,
absent an understanding of these causes and effects, the analysis is
obviously incomplete, and any policy recommendations and
responses may be merely band-aids that describe the symptoms
without addressing needed reforms.
Another analytical weakness, hopefully avoided here, is the
tendency to blame the messenger: to blame contract law for bad
economic decisions. Contract law merely allows parties to enter into
voluntary economic transactions. Given that voluntary transactions
are based on individual assessments of needs and wants, and
expectations about the future, which may prove wrong, it is inevitable
that some such transactions will go awry. This is even more likely in
periods of economic volatility, for example, when an economic boom
turns to bust. But contract law does not encourage parties to make
bad decisions (that honor belongs elsewhere, as noted below). It is an
over-simplification-and an inadequate explanation-to say that the
parties made a bad deal because contract law allowed them to do so.
This is not to say that contract law should be outside the analysis;
4
but, if this is where the analysis stops, it will be decidedly incomplete
and may lead to a preordained conclusion that is inconsistent with
party autonomy and American legal traditions. Because contract law
is both the mechanism for and the measure of wealth creation,5 the
4. The role securitization played in this crisis has previously been noted. Alvin C. Harrell,
Commentary, The Subprime Lending Crisis-the Perfect Credit Storm?, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
626 (2007); see also infra Part I.B.5.
5. As well as being essential to our Constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Kay v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, No. 03-6647,
2005 WL 2683075 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2005) (mem.). Obviously, beyond basic barter transactions,
contracts are necessary to enable consumers to enter voluntary transactions to maximize their well-
being, i.e., to exchange things they have (including time and effort) for other things they want more. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27-100 (2d ed. 1977). If private parties are
precluded from such exchanges, the economy as well as the parties suffer. Id. at 271-286 (addressing
the issue of market failure); Fields, supra note 3. For example, if consumers cannot get credit, they
cannot buy as much, and economic activity will decline. Money, in turn, serves as the contractual
measure of value for parties in such transactions (i.e., an accounting unit and medium of exchange, but
2010l
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result may be public policies that unduly discourage private
transactions and impair economic growth. This is precisely the
scenario described below.
I. WHAT HAPPENED (AND WHY)-THE STORY OF THE
GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
A. Background-Credit Bubbles
History (and certainly American history) has been characterized by
the ebb and flow of credit availability, coincident with economic
boom and bust cycles.6 Credit expansions and contractions feed on
themselves and are often unintentionally reinforced by public policy
responses, 7 and therefore may seem to take on lives of their own;
however, legitimate credit, being dependent on law, always requires
certain basic societal elements to flourish, for example, a stable
political, monetary, and legal environment. Absent these elements,
widespread private credit will not exist; with them, it will.8 With the
unique American foundation of Constitutional federalism and state
common law patterned on British traditions, including party
autonomy, limited government, due process, and an independent
judiciary, and (in the late Twentieth Century) legal reforms such as
only if it can also serve as a reasonable store of value). JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 184-85 (1976). Laws and policies that impair these basic functions are obviously
counterproductive.
6. Assisted by what some have called a tendency toward "collective hallucination." See, e.g., Lee
Gomes, Digital Tools, All Aboard the Bubble Express, FORBES, Mar. 15, 2010, at 34; see also Mark
Frankel, When the Tulip Bubble Burst, BUS. WK., April 24, 2000, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_17/b3678084.htm (reviewing MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA, THE
STORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST COVETED FLOWER AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED
(2d ed. 2000)).
7. See sources cited supra note 5. An obvious public policy example is the efforts, in the face of
massive foreclosure losses for creditors and investors, and declining credit availability for consumers, to
make the enforcement of contracts and mortgage liens even more difficult and expensive. See generally
Symposium, Debt Collection, Mortgage Law, and Foreclosure, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 221
(2009); sources cited infra note 28.
8. See sources cited supra note 5. Probably we do not need behavioral economists to tell us that
people enjoy consumption; given the opportunity, they like to borrow money and buy things. See, e.g.,
Laurie A. Burlingame, Getting to the Truth of the Matter: Revising the TILA Credit Card Disclosure
Scheme to Better Protect Consumers, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 308, 329-331 (2007) (noting
behavioral economic studies of consumer behavior that reflect this trait).
[Vol. 26:41212
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code and the end of
unrealistic usury statutes, there was an unprecedented convergence of
the required elements that helped to create a fifty year credit and
economic boom. In the early part of the Twenty-First Century this
began to unravel, for the reasons noted below.
Throughout this roughly fifty year credit expansion, of course,
there continued to be economic ups and downs, and tensions between
the advocates and opponents of expanded credit availability,
reflecting in part the conflicting needs to protect both party autonomy
and vulnerable consumers. These tensions resulted in political
compromises such as the Truth in Lending Act,9 other measures
designed to restrict various classes of consumer debt,' 0 and still other
measures designed to increase the availability of credit for specified
types of transactions and classes of consumers.11 Facilitated by an
accommodative Federal Reserve Board (FRB) monetary policy and a
global economic boom that created economic conditions favoring
investment flows into financial asset securitization, 12 efforts to
expand housing credit became a primary focus of government policy
beginning in the early 1990s, resulting in an unusual, if not
unprecedented, nearly fifteen year housing and credit boom,
commencing in roughly 1993.13
9. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j (2006).
10. See, e.g., FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.1 (2009).
11. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(2006); Community Reinvestment Act,
12 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006); see infra Part I.B.4.
12. See discussion infra. Among other things, the U.S. credit and housing boom of 1993-2006
dramatically increased imports and created large dollar balances abroad, in turn creating a global
demand for securitized financial assets as a reinvestment vehicle.
13. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, The Clinton Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A20;
infra Part I.B.4. For most of the post-World War II period, there were multiple economic cycles
(including credit and housing cycles) each decade. See, e.g., Donald C. Lampe, Fred H. Miller & Alvin
C. Harrell, Introduction to the 2008 Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 63 BUS. LAW.
561, 562-63 (2008) (citing various sources). The 1993-2006 cycle was unusually long in comparison.
Id
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B. The Credit and Housing Boom of 1993-2006-How It Happened
1. Introduction
As suggested above and discussed further below, 14 some of the
antecedents to the 1993-2006 credit and housing boom go back at
least to 1977, when the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was
enacted, and perhaps even 1969, when the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA) was enacted. But, despite some previews in the 1970s
and 1980s, decades marked by their own credit and housing booms
and busts, 15 the mother of all credit and housing booms had to await
the other, related developments that began in the early 1990s; as
noted below at Parts I.B.2-6. These developments set the stage for
the Great Credit Contraction that began in 2007.
2. The FRB
The first of these developments, and the most easily identifiable
factor contributing to the crisis, was FRB monetary policy, which
turned unusually accommodative in the early 1990s and remained so
for nearly fifteen years thereafter. More than any other factor, this
explains why credit expanded and asset prices exploded over this
period.
While in hindsight this is easy to criticize, it was not an irrational
policy posture, though it turned out to be ill-advised. In the early
1990s the condition of the banking system and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was in question, and there were
concerns-in the wake of the previous housing and credit collapse of
the late 1980s and early 1990s-that the banking system would
follow much of the thrift industry into insolvency. 16 The FRB kept
14. See supra notes 10-11; infra Part I.B.4.
15. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Penn Square Bank-20 Years Later: Introduction to the Symposium,
27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 945 (2002).
16. See infra note 17. These same types of risks remain a concern today. Compare Michael M.
Phillips, America's Newest Land Baron: FDIC, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at Al (noting the state of
the FDIC fund), and David Enrich, TARP Can't Save Some Banks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at C1
(noting financial problems in the banking industry); and Peter J. Wallison, The Permanent TARP, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A25 (same), with KANE, infra note 17, at 1-18 (similar issues in late 1980s).
[Vol. 26:41214
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interest rates high throughout the thrift crises of the 1980s, 17
unwilling to sacrifice monetary stability to save the thrifts, which,
after all, were someone else's responsibility. But when the resulting
recession threatened to drag down the banks, the FRB took a different
stance.
Thus, beginning in 1993 the FRB took its foot off the brakes and
stomped on the monetary accelerator. Together with a more lenient
bank regulatory stance during the Clinton presidency (at least
regarding credit standards), 18 and ultimately the fiscal stimulus of the
significant tax reductions pushed by a Republican-controlled
Congress, these measures had the desired effect: credit and the
economy began to boom again. Asset prices surged; the banks-and
the FDIC-were saved.
No doubt (then, as now) the FRB intended to take its foot off of the
accelerator as soon as the economy got moving again. No one would
suggest that the monetary authorities intentionally pushed too hard, or
for too long. But as usual unforeseen events intervened, including a
series of new crises, including: the bursting of the dot.com bubble;
the Russian debt crisis; a major hedge fund collapse; Y2K; the 9-11
attacks; the Asian currency crisis; Enron and other major
bankruptcies; 19 various election cycles (one can't raise interest rates
in an election year, now, can one?20); and the need to fund various
wars and federal programs. All of these created needs for urgent
17. For sources noting the devastating impact of high interest rates on the thrift industry in the 1980s,
see, e.g., George Sutton, Penn Square Bank-20 Years Later: A Personal Recollection of the Causes and
Effects of the Banking and Deposit Insurance Crisis of the 1980s, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 969, 972-
73 (2002); Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the Structure of the
American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 179, 186-89; JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT
SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 37-40 (1991); EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS 72-75
(1989).
18. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 13. This was a stance that directly favored a credit expansion:
leniency on credit standards, coupled with vigorous enforcement of the CRA and fair lending
requirements. See, e.g., infra Part I.B.4.
19. The political responses often led to yet another crisis. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, The
Federalization of Corporate Law, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 18 (2006); Lampe, Miller & Harrell,
supra note 13.
20. For one thing, that might make the FRB a political issue, like the way energy companies are
treated when the world-wide price of oil rises. Truly, this is better avoided. Still, the FRB has hardly
escaped criticism. See infra note 28.
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monetary measures to forestall the potential for a spreading economic
crisis.
The FRB got us through all of this with nary a scratch, and was
widely acclaimed for doing so. Moreover, the FRB is a creature of
(and answers to) Congress, and Congress loves low interest rates,
expanded home ownership, increasing asset prices, and widespread
credit availability. The CRA and ECOA reflect Congressional
mandates for this state of affairs,2 1 and the federal banking regulators
got the message; then there was a heavily subsidized and aggressively
expanding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.22 In all, the credit and
housing boom of 1993-2006 was a fine party and the FRB kept the
punchbowl full. Who would want to be a naysayer and swim against
this tide?
There was only one fundamental problem. Inevitably, the housing
and credit boom turned into a bubble. Now, a point that is suitable for
emphasis here is that no one can actually tell when this is happening,
only perhaps in retrospect.2 3 Anyone who tried to warn of the dangers
during this boom was (as usual) left in the dust as asset prices seemed
24 2destined to accelerate forever. Few wanted it to end.25
21. See infra Part I.B.4. See also Richard W. Fisher, Congress is Politicizing the Fed, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26,2010, at A17.
22. See infra Part I.B.3.
23. Indeed, it should be noted that, if monetary authorities are allowed to create a continuous
currency devaluation and inflationary spiral, the asset boom may never end, at least as measured in
terms of monetary valuation. In this scenario, anyone who tries to stand in the way by betting against a
continuation of the bubble is at risk of being financially trampled. See, e.g., Associated Press, Investors
See Gold Upsurge as Shield Against Dollar, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 12, 2009, at lB (noting the risks of
depreciating currencies). Obviously, this implicates even more serious issues. See, e.g., supra note 5.
24. Id.
25. Again (see supra note 16), one should not be too critical; in this respect, all asset bubbles are the
same-including the current one. See Associated Press, supra note 23; Business Briefs, Fed Watches for
New Bubble, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 25, 2009, at 3B; E.S. Browning, For Stock Investors, Bad Economy
Isn't Bad, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at Cl; Carolyn Cui & Andrea Hotter, Commodities Report,
Copper Rises Despite the Stockpiles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, at C5 (noting that the price of copper
more than doubled last year, even as inventories swelled); Liam Denning, U.S. 's Grossly Distorted
Product, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at CIO ("Washington provides tax breaks to first-time buyers,
guarantees most of the mortgages written, and then buys most of those ... suggest[ing] a worrying case
of amnesia following the bursting of the housing bubble."); Andy Kessler, The Bernanke Market, WALL
ST. J., July 15, 2009, at Al5 ("Ben Bemanke has been the market."); George Melloan, We're All
Keynesians Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2009, at A17 ("[Tlhe Bemanke [FRB] seems to believe the way
to deal with a collapsed bubble is to reinflate it."); Mark Whitehouse, Scott Kilman & Alex Frangos,
Commodity-Cost Jump Threatens to Stifle Rebound, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A4; see also Brian
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Certainly consumers did not want it to end-they wanted to
participate. Today, much of the talk focuses on how unscrupulous
lenders and mortgage brokers suckered hapless consumers into
making unwise decisions (how wonderful it is to have hindsight), but
during the boom it appeared to be free money.26 With the FRB
maintaining interest rates at levels near zero, Fannie and Freddie
pushing mortgage loan rates nearly as low, and housing prices
surging, it seemed that only a fool would decline to borrow money to
take advantage of rapidly rising property markets. 27 Consumers did
not need to be enticed; they were lining up to participate in the good
times, clamoring for loans. FRB policy made this possible, inevitable,
and irresistible.28
3. Fannie and Freddie
From this point in the analysis, in contrast to the role of monetary
policy as noted above, the impact of the various other related factors
becomes somewhat more difficult to assess with any precision. But
clearly, to some extent, the federal government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, facilitated an expansion of
mortgage credit that contributed to the credit and housing boom of
1993-2006.29 Indeed, this was explicitly their purpose and continues
Blackstone, Economists Warn of Asset-Price Bubbles, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at A2.
26. Kind of like today's stock market. See Blackstone, supra note 25; see also infra note 106.
Regarding mortgage fraud, see Michael Corkery, Fraud Seen as a Driver In Wave of Foreclosures,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2007, at Al; infra Part I.B.6.
27. See supra notes 23-25.
28. See supra notes 23-25; see also John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19 ("Monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom."); Review &
Outlook, Geithner's Revelation, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A16. The FRB is now facing some
related criticism. See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy & Damian Paletta, House Attacks Fed, Treasury, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2009, at At; Ron Paul & Jim DeMint, Americans Deserve a Transparent Fed, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 2009, at A21. Of course, it must be conceded that not everyone agrees with the criticism of the
FRB. See Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at
A15; David Henderson, Did the Fed Cause the Housing Bubble?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at A13.
See also Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke Challenged on Rates'Role in Bust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010, at A2;
David Wessel, Bernanke's Puzzling Bubble Logic, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010, at A2.
29. Indeed, as noted above, essentially the same policies are being pursued today, for the apparent
purpose of recreating an asset boom. See supra notes 12, 23-25; Louise Story, Wall St. Finds Profits by
Reducing Mortgages, N.Y. TtMEs, Nov. 22, 2009, at 1.
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to be today. 30 The GSEs also facilitated the boom in mortgage
securitizations 3 1 and an expansion of the secondary market for
32subprime mortgage loans, supporting an increase in subprime
mortgage lending in 2005-2006 at precisely the worst point in the
market cycle. The GSEs increased the impact of the accommodative
FRB monetary policy by using their implicit (now explicit) federal
guarantees to attract huge sums of world-wide capital to the
American mortgage markets, thereby: offering an attractive
investment vehicle for investors eager to beat the nominal yields
offered by the U.S. Treasury, the FRB, and banks; helping reduce
mortgage interest rates to levels that were irresistible to consumers;
and generating excess housing demand and over-investment in
housing finance.
This had the dual effects of driving up housing prices (contributing
to the housing bubble) and driving down mortgage rates, which, in
conjunction with rising housing prices, encouraged excess credit by
making it seem foolish not to borrow money on a house. Of course,
when the government subsidizes something, consumers get more of
it. The GSEs constitute an enormous taxpayer-backed subsidy for
mortgage loans and housing, and, as noted, they expanded this
subsidy dramatically at the worst possible time.33 This encouraged
some investors and home buyers to make poor decisions, with
30. See sources cited infra notes 34-36; Editorial, $126.9 Billion and Counting, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1,
2010, at A24.
31. See discussion infra Part I.B.5.
32. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 3.
33. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Reliving the S & L Meltdown, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2008, at A17
("In effect, we are reliving the S & L crisis, with two giant S & Ls gambling on survival with taxpayer
funds while politicians summon the will to act."); Judy Shelton, Loose Money and the Derivative
Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009 ("[The GSEs] provided the 'underlying security' for many of the
derivative contracts [thereby compounding] the error of government intervention .... Politicians altered
normal credit risk parameters, while the [FRB] distorted housing prices through perpetual inflation."). In
this sense, the GSEs were themselves victims of the market psychology created by FRB monetary policy
and their own federal housing and mortgage programs. Interestingly, however, federal authorities have
essentially "doubled-down" on this strategy. See, e.g., Editorial, $129 Billion and Counting, supra note
30; Editorial, The Biggest Losers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2010, at A16 (noting the continued increase in
GSE losses); Nick Timiraos & James R. Hagerty, Still Broken: No Exit in Sight for US. As Fannie,
Freddie Flail, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2010, at Al. It does not appear that the losses have adversely
affected executive compensation at the GSEs. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Millions for Loan Chiefs
Despite Losses, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B I (noting that Fannie and Freddie CEOs each earn $6
million annual salaries and supplemental payments).
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
adverse consequences for themselves, their communities, and U.S.
taxpayers.
Today, it is almost amusing to recall how the Bush administration
and other public figures promised in early 2008 that the GSEs were
well-capitalized and would save the mortgage markets, when the
problems that had begun to simmer in 2006-2007 finally came to the
attention of the popular media and the public. First, the public was
told that the GSEs were the rock-solid saviors of mortgage finance.34
And, of course, this benefit was supposed to be free (in other words,
self-supporting, like similar federal programs including Social
Security, Medicare, and deposit insurance). 35 Then, surprisingly, it
was announced that a potential bailout might be needed, but with
assurances that not more than $25 billion could ever possibly be
needed and that the most likely scenario was for no bailout at all.
Then, before we knew it, $100 billion might be needed, then $200
billion. Next, the explicit subsidy was $400 billion,36 and the ceiling
on the subsidy was quietly removed all together, leaving taxpayers
with an unlimited liability. Perhaps only the naive are comfortable
that we will ever see any of that money again, or that the bailout is
complete.
37
34. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Freddie Mac Tightens Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at Cl; James
R. Hagerty, Fannie, Freddie Feel Default Heat, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A14; Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Paulson Announces GSE Initiatives (July 13, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp 1079.htrn.
35. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Mortgage Giants Agreeable to Rescue Plan,
but Cost Is Unknown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at A27; see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed.,
Rethinking the Fan and Fred Takeover, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A13 ("Six weeks before they were
seized, their federal regulator. . . declared them more than adequately capitalized."). And then major
auto companies, banks, securities firms, etc., received similar treatment. See Bloomberg News, Treasury
Expands Possibilities for Auto Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B4; Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Uncle Sam,
Subprime Borrower, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2008, at A9. As noted, when this failed to stimulate the
economy, the solution was to increase the bet. See, e.g., Review & Outlook, Barney Frank's Double
Indemnity, WALL ST. J., April 17, 2009, at A12 (describing efforts to create federal guarantees for
municipal bonds); Review & Outlook, A Republican Fannie Mae, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009, at A12
(efforts to create new federal housing subsidies); see also Jonathon GS Koppel, The Cloning of Fannie
and Freddie, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at Al7; Review & Outlook, Fannies Next Big Adventure,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at A14; supra note 33; infra notes 36-37.
36. See supra note 33; infra note 37; see also Review & Outlook, The Fannie Mae Dice Roll
Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20.
37. See supra note 33; Nick Timiraos & James R. Hagerty, Big Decision Looms on Fannie, Freddie,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at A6 (Fannie may need yet another $100 billion in 2010). Other
government-sponsored housing finance programs have fared no better. See Associated Press, Housing
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So, the GSEs gave us a triple whammy of excessive housing
demand and inflated prices, risky over-investment in mortgages and
housing at the peak of the bubble, and ongoing massive government
subsidies and bailouts that will have to be paid by unrelated members
of the public (through slower economic growth, higher taxes, and/or
inflation).38 No one knows exactly how much this will ultimately cost
(perhaps it is better not to know) or how it will be paid (ditto). Nor is
it possible to know at this point precisely how much this contributed
to the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006 or the Great Credit
Contraction that followed. Like contract law generally, the GSEs
facilitated what people wanted to do, although much more
affirmatively and with taxpayer money; presumably, few consumers
were unfairly induced into borrowing and spending too much money
on a house. Unlike contract law, however, the GSEs drew on a
taxpayer subsidy and did more than merely create a legal
environment that allowed consumers the freedom to act. The GSEs
used public subsidies to actively support and encourage a
misallocation of resources into housing, at the peak of a credit
bubble, thereby directly encouraging unwise behavior. While the
precise impact may never be known, this deserves inclusion on any
list of the causes and effects.
Of course, as noted, the GSEs were created precisely for the
purpose of encouraging mortgage finance and home ownership, and
indeed they continue those efforts today.39  In view of the
retrenchment of private credit and investment that characterizes the
Great Credit Contraction, the GSEs, along with the FRB and other
Agency's Financial Cushion Deflates, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 13, 2009, at 3B; Associated Press,
Government Unveils Plans to Aid State, Local Housing Agencies, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 20, 2009, at 3B;
Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed., Homebuyer Tax Credits Threaten the FHA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, at
A2 1; Review & Outlook, Subprime Uncle Sam, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2009, at A24; Review &
Outlook, The Next Fannie Mae, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A16; Review & Outlook, The Next
Housing Bust, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2009, at A16; Nick Timiraos, Delinquency Rate Rises on FHA-
Backed Loans, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2009, at A3; Nick Timiraos, FHA Digging Out After Loans Sour,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, at A2; Nick Timiraos, Study Sees FHA Taking More Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar.
5, 2010, at A3 ("The federal government's mortgage-insurance agency is understating how much risk it
has taken on .... ");. Can anyone detect a pattern here?
38. See Jeb Hensarling & Paul Ryan, Why No One Expects a Strong Recovery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
2009, at A27.
39. See supra notes 33-37.
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
federal agencies and programs, are now the primary sources of
mortgage lending. 40 Their role (and that of the public subsidy) has
been expanded dramatically in response to the crisis they helped
create.4 ' Indeed, rather than seeking to prevent another credit bubble,
government policy is ardently devoted to creating yet another one,
using the GSEs, FRB monetary policy, and a variety of other federal
subsidies, bailouts, and stimulus programs.42 As a result, as General
Douglas MacArthur famously said about war,43 it is unlikely that we
have seen the end of misdirected housing and credit subsidies and
bailouts, related boom and bust cycles, or the resulting ill-advised
housing speculation.
4. The CRA, ECOA, Fair Housing Act, and Federal Enforcement
Again, among the many contributing factors, it is difficult to know
precisely how much the federal fair credit and housing initiatives
contributed to the excessive borrowing and over-investment in
housing during the housing and credit boom of 1993-2006. But
again, there can be little doubt that they played a role.44
40. See supra notes 33-37; Associated Press, Mortgage Investors Struggle to Survive in Financial
Climate, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 7,2010, at 6C.
41. As has the role of the large financial institutions at the heart of the securitization boom. See, e.g.,
Story, supra note 29; Fannie's Next Big Adventure, supra note 35; Review & Outlook, Fannie Mae
Enron, the Sequel, WALL ST. J., Aug 17, 2009, at AI0. See generally supra notes 33-37; infra notes
118, 130.
42. See supra notes 25, 33-37; infra notes 118, 130. Interestingly, federal loan modification
programs are now providing for stated income loans at a 125% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio; these are the
same terms sometimes cited as being predatory and contributing to the current crisis. See, e.g., U.S.
Department of the Treasury Guidelines for the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (HASP),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/homeowner-affordability-plan/FactSheet.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2010) (125% LTV ratio); Orstein et al., supra note 3; Timiraos, supra note 1, at A2. The
only real question is whether this can succeed without the private capital that has been frightened away
by the responses to the current crisis. See supra note 3. So far, the answer is not encouraging. See, e.g.,
Ruth Simon, Foreclosure Rescue Still Bogged Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at A9; Ruth Simon,
Mortgage Program Gathers Steam After Slow Start, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A6; see also infra
Part 1I.
43. "Only the dead have seen the end of war." General Douglas MacArthur (quoting Plato),
Sylvanus Thayer Award Acceptance Address at West Point, N.Y. (May 12, 1962), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html.
44. See Mary Anastasia O'Grady, The Weekend Interview with Gary Becker: Now Is No Time to
Give Up on Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at A9 ("On top of that [a reference to the FRB's low
interest rate policy and excess world liquidity], there were government policies aimed at 'extending the
scope of home ownership in the United States to low-credit, low-income families.' This was done
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The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 45 and Fair Housing
Act 46 have been around since the 1960s, and the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) since 1977 (together, "these laws").47 But
these laws did not become major factors in the credit system until the
1990s. The reasons are instructive.
All of these laws have public purposes that are subject to
widespread consensus. No one can defend invidious discrimination
on grounds of the protected bases in the ECOA, and your author
personally witnessed the "redlining" that occurred (with the blessing
and even encouragement of some federal regulators) during the 1960s
and 1970s as some financial institutions used deposits from older,
inner city areas to fund their expansions into more prosperous
suburbs.48So there can be no doubt that the public policy intentions
behind these laws were good and mostly are the subject of a broad
through 'the Community Reinvestment Act in the '70s and then Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac later on'
and it put many unqualified borrowers into the mix."(quoting Gary Becker, winner of the 1992 Prize in
Economic Sciences)); see also sources cited infra note 142.
45. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f
(2006)).
46. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(2000)).
47. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2901). In 1993, the federal
financial regulatory agencies published a proposal to significantly expand the impact of the CRA.
Proposed Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466-01 (Dec. 21, 1993). A revised proposed rule was issued the
following year. 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (Oct. 7, 1974). The Final Rule was issued in 1995. 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156 (May 4, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e); see also Joseph J. Norton, "Fair
Lending" Requirements: The Intervention of a Governmental Social Agenda into Bank Supervision and
Regulation, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17 (1995); David E. Teitelbaum & John M. Casanova,
Regulatory Reform or Retread? The New Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 51 Bus. LAW. 831
(1996). This coincided with the beginning of the 1993-2006 credit and housing boom, and was a
response to calls by President Clinton in July, 1993 for an expanded CRA regulatory and enforcement
regime. See, e.g., Richard D. Marsico, The New Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: An Attempt
at Implementing Performance-Based Standards, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 47 (1995). These
developments also coincided with a dramatic increase in fair lending enforcement actions by federal
agencies, including the U.S. Department of Justice. See, e.g., Paul H. Schieber, Decatur Federal and Its
Five (So Far) Progeny: US. Department of Justice Fair Lending Settlements, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 68 (1995); David E. Teitelbaum & Clarke D. Camper, Developments in Fair Lending, 51 Bus.
LAW. 843 (1996); David E. Teitelbaum, Developments in Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment,
50 Bus. LAW. 1023 (1995).
48. In fairness it should be noted that this was where the credit demand was greatest, to fund
suburban growth perhaps fueled in part by a flight of families from the school busing programs designed
to integrate inner city school systems. See JACE WEAVER, THEN TO THE ROCK LET ME FLY: LUTHER
BOHANON AND JUDICIAL ACTIvIsM 71-116 (1993) (describing the history of the tumultuous struggle to
integrate the Oklahoma City public school system).
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
consensus. If only that were enough to assure rational implementation
and avoid unintended consequences.
That these laws, and particularly the ECOA and Fair Housing Act,
coincided with a broad consensus meant that market forces already
were at work correcting the abuses. It is apparent that unwarranted
discrimination is economically detrimental to all parties concerned,
quite aside from the legal issues and these laws. No rational creditor
or merchant can ignore the important consumer markets protected by
the ECOA, Fair Housing Act, and CRA. By the 1970s, creditors and
merchants already were moving rapidly to improve service in
underserved markets, though the more rapid increases in suburban
housing markets meant that these markets continued to be net
importers of capital, while more mature markets experienced net
outflows. Together with practical and statutory limitations on the
remedies available under the ECOA, Fair Housing Act and CRA,4 9
this meant that these laws had little effect until the 1990s.
This changed when the Clinton administration sought to address
the credit contraction of 1988-1992 (our latest experience with such a
phenomenon prior to the current problems) by using federal authority
to mandate expanded credit availability. 50 This reinforced the natural
concern (certain to be magnified in the context of any credit
contraction-as will no doubt be illustrated again in 2010) that low-
income and minority consumers were suffering from reduced credit
availability. The Clinton administration apparently understood the
relation and adverse impact of a credit contraction on the entire
economy, and moved quickly to reverse the rather heavy-handed
emphasis of the prior Bush administration on shutting-down banks
and thrifts and pursuing enforcement actions against institution-
affiliated parties.5'
49. See John L. Ropiequet, Racial Discrimination Claims in Current Mortgage and Auto Finance
Litigation: The Song Remains the Same, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 156 (2009); John L. Ropiequet &
Nathan 0. Lundby, Dealer Rate Participation Class Actions Under the ECOA: Have We Reached the
End of the Road?, 62 BUS. LAW. 663 (2007).
50. See sources cited supra notes 44-47.
51. The latter emphasis undoubtedly contributed to the credit contraction of 1988-1992 and the
ensuing recession. Apparently these Bush-era policies were partly a response to politically-sensational
allegations that prominent politicians were associated with the collapse of some high-profile thrifts and
20101 1223
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As noted, this reversal of public policies in the early 1990s
included highly-publicized concerns about credit availability, as is
natural (and probably inevitable) in the aftermath of a credit
contraction. These concerns were widely expressed in the media and
elsewhere. 52 This correlation of policy concerns made it an easy
decision for the Clinton administration to reverse the course of the
prior Bush administration and seek expanded credit availability. The
result was a series of related policy decisions that set the stage for the
credit and housing boom of 1993-2006.
These policy decisions included: (1) a shift in bank regulatory
policy, from a focus on safety and soundness to increased emphasis
on promoting the CRA, fair lending, and increased credit availability;
(2) strengthening of the CRA itself;53 (3) the enactment of HMDA;54
(4) aggressive fair lending enforcement by various federal agencies; 55
and (5) an unprecedented wave of bank mergers and consolidations,
induced in part by the regulatory crackdown of the Bush years and
new intrusions of federal policy into bank management and credit
underwriting decisions that began in the Bush years (some of which
changed the fundamental nature of bank regulation, to the discomfort
of many bankers).56 The latter created unprecedented opportunities
for expansion by large banks, through mergers, acquisitions, and
branching; but the CRA meant that advocacy groups could (and
the related taxpayer bailout of the savings and loan deposit insurance system. KANE, supra note 17, at
51-55; Harrell, supra note 15, at 206-13 (also noting the emotional tone of some media coverage). In
any event, the resulting Bush-era crack-down on the financial system probably triggered the credit
crunch and serious recession of the early 1990s, an error the Clinton administration was obviously
determined not to repeat. See, e.g., supra note 47.
52. See Norton, supra note 47. This is in stark contrast to the prior demands for retribution against
the financial industry for its loose lending standards. See sources cited supra note 51.
53. See sources cited supra note 47.
54. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2000)); see John L. Ropiequet, Nathan 0. Lundby, Kenneth J. Rojc & Sara B.
Lubezny, Update on ECOA and Fair Lending Developments, 63 Bus. LAW. 663,666-70 (2008); Joseph
T. Lynyak, Hl, Developments in Fair Lending Affecting the Residential Mortgage Industry, 61
CONSUMER FiN. L.Q. REP. 775 (2007); Joseph M. Kolar & Jonathon D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act: Its History, Evolution and Limitations, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 189 (2005);
Jacqueline S. Akins, Impact of the Regulation C Revisions, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 289 (2002).
55. See sources cited supra note 47.
56. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 47; Alvin C. Harrell, It's the Banking Legislation, Stupid!, 47
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 81 (1993); Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary, The Wrath of Khan[gress], 45
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 2 (1991).
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
would) seek to block these expansions unless the bank demonstrated
aggressively that credit was being made available to underserved
groups and communities. As a result, many banks devoted significant
new resources to lending that did not meet traditional credit
underwriting standards. The higher default rates that are inherent in
such lending were considered a cost of doing business, required by
law as the price for bank expansion.57
There were numerous secondary effects-and more than a few
ironies-in all of this. The draconian federal agency enforcement
powers created in 1988-1993 to assure the safety and soundness of
the banking system, by providing the regulatory agencies increased
authority to prevent irresponsible lending, were used in part to
essentially demand that bankers make CRA loans and fund
community organizations and advocacy groups that, in turn,
demanded more of the same.58 Bankers who disagreed had little
choice but to leave the business, and many did. One consequence was
an unprecedented consolidation of the banking system, away from the
decentralized model of locally-owned and locally-managed
community banks and thrifts that previously made America unique
and traditionally assured Americans of exceptional access to credit.
59
Competitive pricing and loan underwriting by multiple local,
independent mortgage originators was largely replaced by uniform,
legally-safer national credit scoring systems that allow no room for
the creditor to take a risk based on the borrower's non-quantifiable
needs and prospects.
60
57. Beginning in 2007, as the federal and state crackdown on subprime mortgage lending intensified
and borrowers disappeared, housing prices began to decline and these losses turned out to be much
worse than many anticipated. See Constance Mitchell Ford, Foreclosures Continue to Put a Damper on
Home Prices, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A6; Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, 1 in 4 Borrowers
Under Water, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, at Al; sources cited supra note 3; discussion infra at Part
I.B.7.
58. See Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the Structure of the
American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 179 (1993) (describing FIRREA, FDICIA, and
the Crime Control Act); see also supra notes 44, 56; Norton, supra note 47.
59. See sources cited supra notes 15, 17. In effect, much of the traditional American financial system
was dismantled, beginning in 1989. Id.; Harrell, supra note 58.
60. See Lynyak, supra note 54; sources cited supra notes 58, 59.
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By the early 1990s these laws and policies had led to a restructured
banking system, that, after the essential demise of the traditional thrift
industry that had served the nation's housing finance needs for over a
century,61 left large markets of credit-worthy consumers without
access to mortgage credit. While financial institutions and many
advocacy organizations were being well funded, many consumers
were not. 62 As today, this had the makings of a true, long-term credit
crisis-with the possibility that governments would be called in to
assume direct control of the housing finance system as a final resort.
But what happened next surprised nearly everyone. The technology
revolution of the 1990s produced personal computer software
programs that allowed nearly anyone (with minimal instruction) to
master the complex art of originating mortgage loans. Now, almost
anyone could be a mortgage broker or a mortgage banker, generating
or even originating mortgage loans and earning the fees that such a
complex process justifies. An expanding need for subprime mortgage
credit met up with an expanding capability for delivering it. All that
was needed was a source of funds. And for that problem, centuries-
old contract law principles, together with the FRB and GSEs,
63
provided a solution. As so often in the past, contract law provided the
legal basis for a series of voluntary relationships that directed private
capital to facilitate the satisfaction of social and economic needs. The
process was called securitization.
5. Securitization
As previously noted, securitization played a role in the credit and
housing boom of 1993-2006 and the Great Credit Contraction that
64 65followed.64 Others have examined it at greater length so it need be
61. See JOSEPHINE HEDGES EWALT, A BUSINESS REBORN, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN STORY, 1930-
1960 chs. 1, 9, 10, app. 2 (1962); sources cited supra notes 58, 59.
62. See Alvin C. Harrell, Strong Banks, Weak Economy, 46 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 49 (1992); see
also infra note 109 (noting similar conditions today); sources cited supra notes 1, 3 (same).
63. See supra Parts I.B.2-3.
64. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, The Subprime Lending Crisis-the Perfect Credit Storm?, 61
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 626 (2007).
65. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 3 (citing numerous other sources); Derrick M. Land, Residential
Mortgage Securitization and Consumer Welfare, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 208 (2007).
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
noted only briefly here. But, even in this brief treatment, it is
apparent that, once again, ironies abound.
As suggested immediately above at Part I.B.4, in the latter part of
the Twentieth Century and especially following the impairment of the
traditional thrift industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerns
were expressed, in the media and by policy makers and consumer
advocates, as to whether consumers would have sufficient access to
mortgage credit. 66 The policy responses included federal initiatives
such as the ECOA, CRA, HMDA, and increased fair lending
enforcement efforts, 67 all designed to mandate increased availability
of credit for minority, low-income, inner city, and other protected
classes of subprime borrowers. 68 These concerns were elevated to
even greater prominence in the early 1990s, with respect to mortgage
credit, following the contraction of the traditional thrift industry, as
thrifts were historically the primary financial intermediaries willing
to originate large volumes of long-term fixed-rate residential
mortgage loans and hold them in the institution's "portfolio. 69
As the thrift industry retrenched in response to onerous new laws
and regulations, and the community banking system also (for many
of the same reasons) entered a significant consolidation phase,
70
credit tightened and by the early 1990s a "credit crunch" ensued. The
need for increased credit availability became a paramount national
priority, and as noted above the traditional tools of federal law,
including mandates, enforcement, actions and penalties, subsidies
(including deposit insurance and implicit federal guarantees for
Fannie and Freddie), tax benefits, monetary policy and direct
funding, were brought to bear in an increasingly aggressive manner.
7 1
66. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
67. See supra Part I.B.4.
68. See supra Part I.B.4; Gottlieb & McGuinness, supra note 3 (noting that some municipalities
suing lenders for extending inner-city mortgage credit previously pressured lenders to do exactly that).
69. See EWALT, supra note 61. Thus the moniker "portfolio lending" describes this practice. This
reliance on investments in long-term, fixed-rate mortgage loans, required by federal law and regulation,
was a prescription for disaster when interest rates skyrocketed in the 1970s and 1980s. This story has
been told elsewhere. Harrell, supra note 17; Harrell, supra note 15.
70. See Harrell, supra note 17; Harrell, supra note 15; see also sources cited supra notes 17, 51-52,
56-58.
71. See supra notes 17, 51-52, 56-58; see also supra Part I.B.4. This may sound familiar to those
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But here is another irony: these 1990s federal initiatives
undoubtedly had an effect, though perhaps in unexpected ways and
some more than others.72 Yet the dramatic increase in the availability
of credit for subprime borrowers in 1993-2006 would not have been
possible without private sector innovations based on the most
traditional of our state common law principles: the law of contracts,
which made possible the world-wide securitization of mortgage
loans.
Here is the irony: securitization made possible the
"democratization of credit," that is, the widespread availability of
relatively low-cost private mortgage credit, a historically desirable
and unprecedented development. 73 This was precisely the goal of the
assorted federal laws and policies noted above, but was achieved
largely without the help of any of them, instead relying primarily on
private capital from unregulated sources (with the prominent
exceptions of FRB monetary policy and, to some extent, Fannie and
Freddie).74 Again, ironically, some of those who had demanded the
observing today's headlines. Once again today the nation is experiencing a credit contraction induced by
onerous laws and excessive regulation. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 3, 5, 7; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.,
Washington's Suicide Mission, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at A21 ("The urgent problem is the giant
riverboat gamble that Washington can save the economy by doing what comes naturally-spending
money carelessly, creating massive new entitlements without funding them, dishing out cheap credit to
politically favored sectors, [and] telling business people where and how to invest."). But this time the
results are likely to be very different than in the 1990s, as discussed below and at Part H1; see also Peter
Eavis, Finance Fixers Still Living in Denial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at C18; Peter Eavis,
Congress's Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2009, at C14 (noting the counter-productive nature of
many current legislative proposals).
72. Monetary policy, for example, has already been mentioned as a major factor, see supra Part
I.B.2., as have Fannie and Freddie, see Part I.B.3. and CRA, etc., Part I.B.4.
73. See S. Mitra Kalita, The 'Democratization of Credit' Is Over-Now It's Payback Time, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 10-11, 2009, at Al.
74. See supra Parts 1.B.2-4. If you doubt this statement in the text, consider that these same federal
policies are being replicated today, in some cases (including monetary policy and funding by Fannie and
Freddie) on a significantly grander scale, the primary difference being a lack of any material role for
private risk capital. See Heard on the Street, US. 's Grossly Distorted Product, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,
2009, at CIO ("Washington provides tax breaks to first-time buyers, guarantees most of the mortgages
written, and then buys most of those .. "). Consequently, this time the results are quite different: much
of the mortgage market, dependent almost entirely on federal initiatives, is starved for credit; housing
prices continue at depressed levels unemployment remains stubbornly high; and foreclosures are
skyrocketing. See sources cited supra notes 2, 3; supra notes 71-73. See also Robert B. Reich, The
Economy: A Year Full of Challenges; Main Street, Suckered Again, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at A39;
David Streitfield, A Battered City Fears the End of Housing Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at Al;
Mark Whitehouse, Turbulent Markets:Rising US. Job Worries Add to Upheaval, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
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democratization of credit, through federal or local policies mandating
increased credit availability for marginal borrowers, soon began
attacking securitization because it accomplished these very purposes,
allegedly enabling consumers to borrow and spend too much
money.
75
There can be no doubt that securitization played a major role in
facilitating the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006. It provided a
substitute for the portfolio lending of a declining thrift industry, and a
legal structure for transactions allowing all of those involved-
borrowers, brokers, mortgage bankers, securities firms, and
investors-to do what they wanted to do: invest in the real estate
boom. In turn, this reinforced the boom (as easy credit always does).
One can hardly blame these private market participants for wanting to
join in the housing boom and resulting economic prosperity, and it is
unfair to do so (absent fraud, as discussed below). If there is blame
for not preventing the bubble, it lies primarily with the monetary
policy and other government programs that first created the boom and
then undercut it, not those merely seeking to ride the wave, though it
is probably asking too much to expect any federal authority to
manage or constrain rising housing prices in a timely and appropriate
manner (especially in our politically-charged economic
environment). Securitization undoubtedly facilitated the funding of
mortgage loans by spreading (and therefore seeming to understate)
the risks, as it was supposed to do; ironically, then, securitization is
blamed for doing exactly what it was designed to do: facilitate
expanded credit availability, and reduce its cost, by attracting private
capital and spreading the financial risk. But it is inappropriate to
blame this for housing and credit cycles.
Yet, this is pretty much what the critics of securitization are
saying: "securitization encouraged market participants to push risk to
2010, at A9. The primary variable that has changed is the loss of private credit, for example, through
securitizations, for the reasons noted below. This provides an unusually clear-cut control factor in our
continuing experimentation with a reliance on federal housing and credit policy. See Mortgage Investors
Struggle to Survive in Financial Climate, supra note 40; sources cited supra note 42.
75. See, e.g., Kalita, supra note 73; Eggert, supra note 3; Gottlieb & McGuinness, supra note 3.
Again, this is akin to blaming the messenger; obviously, if credit is more widely available, more people
will use it, and there will be more defaults, especially in a subsequent recession.
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the very edge of what the applicable market standards would tolerate
. ... Thinly capitalized subprime lenders could generate large
numbers of loans likely to default . ,76 In effect, securitization
allowed private parties to enter mortgage contracts, so they did so
with wild abandon, thereby causing a boom and bust cycle. Of
course, there is some truth to this: securitization allowed subprime
consumers, brokers, mortgage bankers, securities firms, and investors
to do precisely what they wanted to do--and what seemed attractive
and beneficial in a period of rising housing prices and home-
ownership rates. Those who joined in this enterprise early enough did
quite well (at least for awhile), and if the boom had not ended, many
of those who now suffer would be congratulating themselves for their
financial acumen. Their actual experience is one often shared by
others who have chased a credit boom by investing in commodities,
the stock market, bonds, or almost any other type of asset or
investment transaction at the peak of a credit cycle. In this respect
consumers are in good company, having shared the adverse effects of
the Great Credit Contraction with a star-studded cast of professional
investors and brilliant financial minds.
77
There are public policy risks to an over-emphasis on these issues.
The only way to prevent people from making such mistakes is to
prevent them from being able to borrow money to participate in
economic booms. One way to do this is to significantly restrict
private credit and contract law because these are the mechanisms by
which people participate in such transactions, perhaps substituting
public funding mechanisms designed to target credit availability to
selected groups and institutions and limit it to socially desirable
purposes. As noted below, our public policy has now moved
decisively in that direction and, as a result, in conjunction with the
end of the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006 and the Great
76. Eggert, supra note 3, at 1257, 1276-81. Cf authorities cited supra note 28.
77. See sources cited supra note 6 (noting the history of such things and the role of "collective
hallucination," which (it should be noted) is not limited to consumers and also afflicts voters, scientists,
and public offices). See also sources cited supra note 23, regarding the financial perils of resisting or
being left out of such a boom; O'Grady, supra note 44 (noting the rationality of efforts to participate in
an inflationary economic boom); sources cited supra note 28.
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Credit Contraction, private subprime mortgage lending and
securitization has come almost to a halt.78 Federal agencies direct and
essentially fund the mortgage credit that is now flowing, assuming
that it is targeted at select recipients. 79 So the opponents of private
securitizations now have it their way; this kind of lending has nearly
ceased, and the consumer mortgage markets are again (as in the early




No discussion of the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006 and
the Great Credit Contraction that has followed would be complete
without a discussion of mortgage fraud. Again there is a sense of d~ja
vu in this; those of us who followed this area of law during the
previous credit and housing boom and collapse, characterized by the
deposit insurance crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s, may recall
the public focus throughout that period on fraud and abuse by "S & L
Kingpins" and other financial insiders.8 1 One could hardly turn on the
78. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Obama Slams 'Fat Cat' Bankers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at
A4; Fields, supra note 3; Heard on the Street, supra note 74; sources cited supra notes 33-38. Of course,
it is not clear that the new regulation and subsidies will, in fact, result in an optimal allocation of
resources. See Associated Press, Nobel Winners Study Keys to Financial Crisis, OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 13,
2009, at 5B ("the scholars' research did not suggest that more government oversight would prevent
financial crises."); Review & Outlook, Hope vs. Financial Experience, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at
A16; see also Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Loopholes Lurk in Bank Bill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,
2009, at Cl (noting special interest provisions in the 2009 financial "reform" bill); Louise Story,
Investment Funds Profit Again, This Time by Paring Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2009, at I
(noting the large profits being reaped by the investment funds that contributed to the housing bubble);
supra note 71; sources cited supra notes 33-38. Nonetheless, that is clearly the current direction of
American policy. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act,
63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 140 (2009); infra Parts II, III. Something that should, perhaps, be of
concern to consumers is whether our individual borrowing and consumption preferences will be deemed
socially desirable by our government overseers.
79. See sources cited supra note 78; see also Associated Press, Home Tax Credit May Help,
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 24, 2009, at IB ("ITlhe gains in October [2009] mainly reflected the tax credit of up
to $8,000 for new homeowners .... "). See also sources cited supra notes 33-38; Asher Hawkins, FHA:
The Feds' Next Housing Debacle, FORBES, Mar. 15, 2010, at 26 (noting likelihood of fraud).
80. See sources cited, supra note 79. The results, however, were predictable: "I wouldn't want to bet
the house on housing ... in terms of the strength of the U.S. economy . . . ." Home Tax Credit May
Help, supra note 79 (quoting Diane Swonk, chief economist at Mesirow Financial in Chicago); see also
Ruth Simon, Foreclosure Rescue Still Bogged Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at A9.
81. See Harrell, supra note 15, at 946.
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television or open a newspaper without being told of public "outrage"
over such abuses. 82 In the end, of course, it was structural factors
(including, as again in the past fifteen years, federal laws and
regulatory policy83) that caused most of the problems, and insider
abuse was a very minor factor in the losses.
84
And so it goes again. Today, mortgage fraud is sometimes said to
have been a major cause of the credit and housing boom of 1993-
2006, and the Great Credit Contraction that followed.85 Typically this
is said to be the result of inadequate regulation, thus supporting the
agenda of those who see more regulation as the answer to all such
problems.86 A typical quote comes from the Attorney General of
Illinois, courtesy of Professor Eggert: "It was no easy matter to prove
that questionable products and practices were illegal when there were
no written federal rules or regulations specifically prohibiting
them." 87 But preventing fraud and deception, in all aspects of human
endeavors, always has proved to be easier said than done, even when
the practices are specifically prohibited. This line of analysis may
lead to the conclusion that the only effective solution is to prohibit
essentially everything, unless it is expressly approved by the
government, because otherwise someone will come up with a new
variation (such as securitization in the 1990s) that overcomes the
existing limitations.88 It is not hard to see where this will lead.
82. Id.
83. See supra Parts I.B.2-4.
84. Somehow, however, the popular media missed that part of the story. Lurid tales of insider abuse
are just so much more marketable than analyses of federal housing law and credit policy. See sources
cited supra notes 15, 17.
85. See Eggert, supra note 3, at 1284-89. This "fact" is often simply taken for granted. See, e.g.,
infra note 86.
86. Recently your author attended a panel discussion that included federal regulatory agency
representatives. The subject was the housing and credit crisis and potential solutions. Not surprisingly,
the consensus was that more regulation was the answer. Some members of the audience openly treated
this as an established fact, while others treated it as a revelation. In reality, the federalization of
mortgage finance probably enhances the prospects for mortgage fraud. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note
79.
87. See Eggert, supra note 3, at 1284 (quoting Federal and State Enforcement of Financial
Consumer and Investor Protection Laws: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, I1 lth
Cong. 8 (2009) (testimony of Lisa Madigan, Ill. Attorney Gen.)). Yes, it is definitely a challenge to
prove that practices are illegal when they are not prohibited.
88. The proposed federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency will facilitate this approach. See
Harrell, supra note 78.
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A problem in any discussion of mortgage fraud is that it is one of
those chameleon-like terms (like "privacy" or "predatory lending")
that mean different things to different people. Almost everyone is
against bad things, so agreement based on vague terminology and
broad principles may come easy. But the law requires specifics.
Creditors (and some statistics) may refer to the term "mortgage
fraud" as meaning deception by the borrower, such as a fraudulent
credit application;89 others may use the term to refer to fraud by the
appraiser, or broker, or creditor, or all three (for example, a loan
knowingly based on a fraudulent appraisal). 90 Professor Eggert
acknowledges this,91 resisting the temptation to focus entirely on one
party or the other.92 Some cases of mortgage fraud are easy to
identify and label. But, for some purposes, the term remains largely
undefined.
Mortgage fraud always becomes more apparent at the end of a
credit and housing boom. Obviously, booming housing markets and
expanding credit availability provide continuous opportunities to
refinance, thereby papering over many mistakes and even prior fraud.
Fraudulent loan applications and appraisals may be effectively
"cured" (or at least rendered irrelevant) by an expanding economy
with rising incomes and property values. The same is true of many
other types of lending and investment problems. An economic boom
obscures many mistakes. But all of this changes when markets
decline or even collapse. Suddenly, even the best decisions may look
bad, and the worst ones really terrible. At this point, revelations (and
accusations) of fraud and abuse become more common.
This has been going on at least for centuries, and probably longer.
It is not clear to your author that there is a simple, easy solution. Even
the best experts often fail to recognize these problems in advance,
and continually increasing the legal sanctions has not helped.93
89. See Therese G. Franz~n, Update on Mortgage Fraud-What Is Happening Today?, 62
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 14 (2008); Loretta Salzano & A. Michelle Canter, Identifying and Stopping
Mortgage Fraud, 61 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 16 (2007).
90. See Eggert, supra note 3, at 1287-88.
91. Id. at 1284, 1286, 1289-90.
92. Id. at 1286-92.
93. For examples, see sources cited supra notes 15, 17, 58, 78, and 79. For some practical pointers,
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Despite obvious exceptions, 94 it appears that mortgage fraud neither
played a major role in the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006
(though that is obviously not the case in some local markets and
transactions) nor offers much prospect in terms of a solution to
prevent future credit and housing cycles. For one thing, as long as
there are government programs offering free money (or tax credits),
there is likely to be fraud. 95 But the greater danger is that solutions
directed at stamping-out mortgage fraud and other abuses may have
unintended adverse consequences that exceed their benefits, as
suggested below.
7. Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
The developments noted above at Parts I.B.2-6 have been widely,
if not unanimously, recognized as factors contributing to the credit
and housing boom of 1993-2006. The issues discussed below are
different, in at least two ways: (1) generally they have not been
recognized in the media (perhaps due to the technical, legal nature of
the issues); and (2) these are factors that contributed not to the credit
and housing boom of 1993-2006 but to its collapse. Some additional
irony: these are perhaps the most important issues, as they help
explain not the boom,96 but why it ended so disastrously in the Great
Credit Contraction; yet, these factors have received the least attention
of all.
Your author and others have noted these issues before.97 The basic
point is that the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006 ended,
becoming instead the Great Credit Contraction that has followed, in
significant measure due to the imposition of new restrictive state and
federal laws and regulatory initiatives designed to prevent
"predatory" subprime lending. Some of these restrictions on credit
however, see Franz6n, supra note 89, and Salzano & Canter, supra note 89.
94. See sources cited supra note 89.
95. See Pozen, supra note 37; Hawkins, supra note 79.
96. Explaining the boom is the easy part. See supra Parts I.B.2-5.
97. See Donald C. Lampe, Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, Introduction to the 2009 Annual
Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 63 Bus. LAW. 561 (2008); Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary:
The Subprime Lending Crisis-The Perfect Credit Storm?, 61 CONSuMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 626 (2007).
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came at the peak of the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006
(indeed, the boom may have peaked at that time in large measure for
this reason), while others were imposed as the Great Credit
Contraction began (thereby worsening the crash); together these
measures helped to push the consumer mortgage credit system-and
ultimately the entire economy, which depends on such credit-over
the precipice (helped along by a brief and simultaneous period of
FRB tightening 98). At the time, those who tried to point out that these
new restrictions on mortgage credit would reduce the availability of
mortgage credit were ignored or shouted down.99 Yet, that was
inevitable and precisely what happened.
Of course, economic booms end for many reasons, and probably
for reasons that no one fully understands (perhaps owing in part to
extraordinary delusions and the madness of crowdsl). In any event,
it seems apparent that they do end; so it always has been and always
will be.' 0 ' Like earthquakes, it has yet to be demonstrated that anyone
can predict economic booms and busts with any degree of precision,
continual pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding. So, no one
knows for sure why or when these cycles will begin and end, or
likewise why and when the painful aftermath will moderate (though,
as noted above and supra at Parts I.B.2-6, and discussed further
below, public policy can help or hurt).
To some extent, economic booms probably just run out of steam.
In the case of the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006, housing
demand and prices rose so dramatically and for so long that
affordability became an obvious problem. At some point in a boom
cycle asset prices so far outpace incomes that few can afford to play
the game, no matter how low interest rates are or how much credit is
98. See sources cited supra note 97; see also supra notes 5, 28; Associated Press, Fed Freezes
Interest Rates as Economy Caps Inflation, OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 17, 2009, at 1B (includes a graph
illustrating the spike in a key FRB interest rate in roughly the period 2005-2007).
99. At one program your author attended, this suggestion drew the following response from the
program speaker: "That's crap, just crap." See also Harrell, supra note 78.
100. See CHARLES MACKAY, ExTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS
(2009). Others have called this a "collective hallucination." See Gomes, supra note 6.
101. Of course, measures which restrict freedom of contract may prevent some from participating in
the boom (and bust), thereby moderating the cycle by leaving much of the economy in the trough, but
the cycles exist nonetheless. See sources cited supra notes 5, 6, 78.
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available. And, at some point, absent a willingness to destroy the
currency as an effective source of value and medium of exchange, the
FRB must tighten its monetary policy and raise interest rates (of
course, if it does not, the boom can go on but at the cost of even
greater economic problems-and this ever-present possibility is one
of the factors that sustain asset booms, and make economic
predictions so difficult, and frequently inaccurate). 10 2 At some point,
investor concern about these and related issues (including the
potential for a political backlash) may result in a flight of capital;
when this becomes a rush to the exits, the bubble collapses. Such
events apparently coalesced in the United States in roughly 2007.103
This has happened many times before, and historically the markets
have adjusted and rebounded rapidly. But this time there are some
unusual factors at work, with the downward cycle being reinforced
by new restrictions on consumer credit transactions (and threats of
even more), which are making the Great Credit Contraction worse.
As these restrictions (and the increased risks) became more widely
apparent, the end of the credit and housing boom of 1993-2006 was
hastened and became more pronounced, and transformed into
something unusual in American history: an extended credit crunch
referred to here as the Great Credit Contraction. There can be no
doubt that a housing (and economic) boom is built on a credit
expansion, and that restrictions on credit can reverse that process.
That is what happened in the latter part of the first decade of this
century, as states and federal agencies turned increasingly hostile to
mortgage credit transactions, under the rubric of combating predatory
lending. 1°4 Probably even the FRB was surprised by the dramatic
events that followed, including a collapse of the credit cycle and
ultimately the economy, as the promises of a "soft landing" came to
naught.
At the time of this writing we are well into the third year of the
Great Credit Contraction, with no end in sight despite trillions of
102. See sources cited supra notes 6, 23, 25.
103. See Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97.
104. Id.; see also sources cited supra notes 3, 5-6.
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dollars of remedial "stimulus" and bailout spending.105 While this
spending has subsidized a few large entities, and has created some
new bubbles and risks, 10 6 it has not addressed the basic problems
afflicting the credit markets. 10 7 The closest we have come to a public
recognition of these basic issues is the public badgering of bankers
and regulators by politicians, in an apparent effort to deflect attention
from the problems created by ill-advised laws and regulations and
other policy initiatives.1°8 At some point, if we are to move beyond
the current reliance on federal funding and resuscitate normal
mortgage lending, state and federal policy makers will need to
recognize the adverse impacts of their crackdowns on subprime
mortgage lending and create a more rational legal environment for
credit transactions. 10 9 Private investors and creditors cannot be
expected to fully return to these markets until they are comfortable
that mortgage liens and credit contracts will again be routinely
enforceable."10
105. See, e.g Ron Paul, On My Mind, FORBES, Nov. 16, 2009, at 26 ('[Tihe [FRB's] balance sheet
remains bloated at an unprecedented $2 trillion."); sources cited supra notes 2, 3.
106. See Bernard Cordon, The Amnesia in Financial Markets, FORBES, Nov. 16, 2009, at 30 ("The
biggest Bemanke bubble of all: the stock market, which has surged 56% since its March [2009] low.");
see also sources cited supra notes 25-29. This has created a whole new range of financial risks. See
sources cited supra notes 33-37.
107. See Steve Forbes, Bair Market, FORBES, Nov. 16, 2009, at 16 ("I[T]he economy won't be creating
jobs unless the credit system is fully functioning again-and we're still a long way from that.");
Associated Press, Reports on Economy Signal Slight Rebound, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 25, 2009, at 3B;
sources cited supra note 2.
108. See Damian Paletta, Bank Crackdown Draws Criticism, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2009, at Cl.
"Some former regulators say the efforts resemble efforts made by lawmakers in the early 1990s that
prompted bank examiners to relax the rules at the height of the savings-and-loan crisis. That prolonged
the life of some weaker banks and let them dig deeper financial holes." Id. at C4; see also Williamson,
supra note 78; supra notes 15, 17.
109. See Forbes, supra note 107 ("The Treasury Department's pressure on lenders to tear up mortgage
contracts has killed any private-sector appetite for mortgage-backed securities. The only one buying this
stuff these days is the [FRB]."); Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Obama vs. the Banks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17,
2009, at A27 ('The Fed's policy makes sense if the goal is restoring bank profitability .... It is a
terrible policy if the goal is fueling small business, the engine of economic growth and job creation.");
see also sources cited supra notes 2, 3, 74.
110. See supra notes 2, 3, 74.
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II. CONSEQUENCES AND PROSPECTS
The discussion above at Part I describes the causes of the credit
and housing boom of 1993-2006 and Part I.B.7 briefly notes some of
the reasons it ended."' The discussion below focuses on the Great
Credit Contraction that followed, including subsequent measures and
proposals seeking to address the consequences, which continue to be
widespread despite three years of unprecedented federal stimulus
efforts." I
2
Ill. See also Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97; Harrell, supra note 97. As noted here and
predicted in those articles, the credit contraction continues to impair the economy, despite massive new
injections of federal money into the credit markets beginning in 2007-2008. See Associated Press,
Spending Drop Hurts Stocks, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 18,2009, at IB; Associated Press, Bank Lending May
Stay Tight Through 2010, Survey Shows, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 18, 2009, at 3B; Edmund L. Andrews, Vast
Bailout by US. Proposed in Bid to Stem Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al; Jon
Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al; Louis Uchitelle, Tighter Credit Transforming the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept
19, 2008, at Al; sources cited supra notes 1, 2, 3, 74, 109.
112. See sources cited supra notes 1, 2, 3, 107-1 11; Deborah Solomon, James R. Hagerty & Michael
Crittenden, Strains Mount on Bailout Plans-American Express Gets Quicker Access to U.S. Cash;
Fannie Mae May Need More Help, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at Al; David Streitfeld, Almost Entire
Town Is Drowning in Debt as Home Values Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at Al, A21; Jon
Hilsenrath, David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Credit Crisis Strains the Government's Options, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at Al; Vikas Bajaj, Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at Al. If there was ever any doubt, this serves as a reminder of the link between
credit availability and economic growth. See Conor Dougherty, Amy Merrick & Anton Troianovski,
States Slammed by Tax Shortfalls, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008, at Al; Jesse Drucker, U.S. News: States'
Tax Receipts Fell Sharply in Latest Quarter-Spending Reductions Triggered by Balanced-Budget
Rules Threaten to Weaken Demand and Magnify Economic Downturn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at
A3; Charles Jaffe, Like It or Not, Everyone Affected by Credit Crunch, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 27, 2008
(describing some of the ways the credit crunch impacts consumers); Jennifer Levitz, Ilan Brat &
Nicholas Casey, Wall Street's Ills Seep into Everyday Lives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A2; Jeffrey
McCracken, Vanessa O'Connell & Ray A. Smith, Retail Losses Sap a Jobs Safety Net, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 2008, at Al; Prabha Nararajan & Robin Sidel, Bond Woes Choke Off Some Credit to
Consumers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at Cl; Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Prabha Natarajan, Credit-Card
Bonds Fight a Tougher Debt Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2008; John T. Stoll, Tight Credit Puts
Squeeze on Big Three Auto Dealers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at B 1; Peter Thai Larsen, StanChart
Warns Growth Set to Slow, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at 1; sources cited supra note 5; sources cited
immediately above. As noted supra at Part I.B.7 and discussed further below, structural legal factors
contributing to these conditions apparently have blunted the effectiveness of FRB monetary policy, with
the result that the aggressive FRB monetary responses since 2007 have created a potential commodities
bubble and potential inflationary pressures without preventing a credit contraction or recession. See
Mark Gongloff, Ahead ofthe Tape, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2008, at Cl; Kelly Evans, US. News: Price
Increases Ramp Up, Sounding Inflation Alarm- Stimulus Checks Fuel Consumer Spending; Incomes
Fall Behind, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2008, at A3; Don Mecoy, Why Inflation May Be Biggest Threat,
OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 2008, at IB; Ben Steil, We'll All Pay for the Fed's Loose Money Follies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at A13; Brian Wesbury, Inflation is a Clear and Present Danger, WALL ST. J.,
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First, some general observations about the nature of the policy
responses to the Great Credit Contraction. These responses reflect a
distinct bias in favor of federal administration and funding, at the
expense of private mortgage finance (for example, simultaneously
discouraging private finance and increasing federal subsidies for
consumer credit transactions). 1 3 Thus, the current displacement of
private funding by federal funding appears to be a conscious policy
choice rather than merely a response to the recent crisis. This also
reflects, perhaps to an unusual degree, the polarization of political
thought in America today, representing a significantly different
approach to addressing the mortgage needs of consumers, as
compared to traditional funding mechanisms. Beyond this, policy
makers and the media have seemingly failed to recognize the
fundamental nature of the problems afflicting the credit markets.
114
The result is a focus on federal bailouts and subsidies, while other
policies continue to restrain essential, routine consumer
Aug. 19, 2008, at A17; No Quick Fix, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 18, 2008, at 5B ("Despite the government's
repeated attempts to calm financial markets, credit just keeps getting tighter."); see also sources cited
supra notes 23, 25, 28-29, 74.
113. See Bryan Caplan, Special Interest Secret, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2007, at All; see also Lampe,
Miller & Harrell, supra note 97, at 563 & nn.10-13; Harrell, supra note 97; Damian Paletta & David
Enrich, Loopholes Lurk in Bank Bill-USAA, GE and Others Gain Exceptions to Full Impact of
Regulatory Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at C1; see also sources cited supra notes 3, 8, 71, 74;
infra Parts II, IIl.
114. Including the causes and effects. See sources cited supra notes 1-3, supra Part I. See also Peter
Eavis, Finance Fixers Still Living in Denial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at C18; Peter Eavis,
Congress's Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2009, at C14; Review & Outlook, Banker Baiting 101,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, at A20; Brian M. Carney, The Weekend Interview with Anna Schwartz:
Bernanke is Fighting the Last War, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at All; James Grant, Essay, The
Confidence Game, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at WI; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Obama's Dangerous
Bank Bailout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at AlIl (restoring Citi and Bank of America to greatness
shouldn't be the goal); sources cited supra notes 71, 74, 109; see also Review & Outlook, Calling Hank
Paulson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at A14 (asserting that the responses to date were an example of
how not to reassure bank depositors and credit markets); Ethen Penner, How Low Interest Rates
Contributed to the Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at AI5; Krishna Guba, Greenspan Warns
of More Bank Bailouts, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at 1 ("Mr. Greenspan cautions that a heavy handed
regulatory response to the crisis would do more harm than good .... ); Lawrence B. Lindsey, Hank
Paulson's Fannie Gamble, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A13; Dick Army, The Fan/Fred Bailout is a
Scandal, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A15; Notable & Quotable, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A15
(quoting former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, criticizing the federal bailout of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac); Review & Outlook, Housing Bill Hammers Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008, at
A14; Steve H. Hanke, Interest Rates and the Dollar's Value Are Related, WALL ST. J., April 24, 2008, at
A12; Tom Lauricella, Liz Rappaport & Joanna Slater, Doubts on Rescue Plan Spur Fall in Dollar, Leap
for Oil, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at Al; see also sources cited infra note 116.
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transactions. 115 As a consequence, the economy has continued to
suffer even as unprecedented stimulus expenditures have been used
to bail out and subsidize large enterprises.
116
Second, it is noteworthy that the policy initiatives pursued since
2007 are dramatically different in some ways from the responses to
previous credit and housing crises, including the last major credit and
housing cycle." 7 As noted above, the last major downward cycle was
in the 1980s and early 1990s. That cycle was similar to the current
credit contraction in many ways, but the policy responses to date
have been very different. The current approach is to bail out,
subsidize and even expand large insolvent institutions as conduits for
federal funding. 118 In contrast, in the late 1980s and early 1990s:
115. See sources cited supra notes 1-3, 111-114. The results so far cannot be considered successful.
See Ruth Simon, Foreclosure Rescue Still Bogged Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at A9; sources
cited supra notes 1-3.
116. See sources cited supra notes 1-3, 111-114; see also Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic
Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Slips Further, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008, at A1; Jonathan G.S. Koppell,
Uncle Sam, Subprime Borrower, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2008, at A9 (noting the very large expansion of
public liabilities resulting from the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008); Brian Westbury, The Fed's
Interest Rate Dilemma, WALL ST. J., April 30, 2008, at AI7. Despite the lessons of the 1970s, "the
[FRB] opened up the old playbook and cut rates aggressively when subprime loans blew up. This
cemented higher inflation into place, crushed the dollar, pushed commodity prices up sharply, and
created major problems in the energy, airline and agricultural marketplaces." Id. Mr. Westbury, chief
economist at First Trust advisors, L.P., also warned that "[a] replay of the 1970s is likely unless the
[FRB] has the courage to raise rates." See id. The Wall Street Journal noted that, although "no one has
any idea of the real cost," the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 could directly cost taxpayers upwards of a
half trillion dollars, see Housing Bill Hammers Taxpayers, supra note 114; Lawrence B. Lindsey, former
assistant to the president for economic policy, warned that the Economic Stimulus Act is full of
"nonsensical provisions," see Lawrence B. Lindsey, Hank Paulson's Fannie Gamble, supra note 114;
and Dick Armey, House majority leader from 1995 to 2002, noted that the ultimate cost could exceed $1
trillion, see Dick Armey, The Fan/Fred Bailout is a Scandal, supra note 114. As it tumed out, this was
only the beginning. See Andrews, supra note 111; Lauricella, Rappaport & Slater, supra note 113. It is
possible that the costs of these bailouts will be even higher than expected. See Associated Press, Federal
AIG Bailout to Exceed $150B, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 11, 2008, at 6B ($85 billion AIG bailout
subsequently estimated to cost $150 billion); Jackie Calmes, Obama Asks Bush to Provide Help for
Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at Al; Sudeep Reddy & John D. McKinnon, The Financial
Crisis: A Big Unknown: Cost of Bailouts-Profit is Possible for Government if Firms do Well, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A3. Regarding Fannie and Freddie, see sources cited supra notes 35-37; regarding
AIG, see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., The Ugly AIG Post-Mortem, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2009, at Al 7;
Liam Pleven, Matthew Kamitschnig & Deborah Solomon, US. Revamps Bailout of AIG-Taxpayers
Exposed Greater Risk in New Plan; $30 Billion More from TARP Funds, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2009, at
Al.
117. See generally Harrell, The Subprime Credit Crisis-the Perfect Credit Storm?, supra note 97;
compare recent policy initiatives with the response to the banking and deposit insurance crises of the
1980s and early 1990s, described in sources cited supra notes 15 and 17.
118. Considering that the cost of bailing out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may now exceed $400
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insolvent institutions were shut down amid promises that "never
again" would such losses be placed on taxpayers; traditional
measures such as higher capital standards, prompt corrective action,
and mark-to-market accounting were heralded as essential to
preventing a recurrence; and insolvent institution-affiliated parties
were pursued vigorously through an aggressive federal enforcement
effort.1 19 The media drumbeat reached almost a frenzy in its outrage
at the prospect that the crisis might cost as much as $150 billion. 120
billion, see sources cited supra notes 35-37, adding in the $700 billion bailout bill passed in late
September, 2008, see sources cited infra note 145, and counting other assorted 2008 financial bailouts,
see sources cited infra notes 144-147, the total cost of the 2008 bailouts alone could exceed several
trillion dollars. See also Andrews, supra note 111; David M. Herszenhom, Administration Is Seeking
$700 Billion for Wall St. in Possible Record Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at 1; supra note 3.
With the $700 billion September, 2008 bailout, the previous $350 billion for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, $200 billion or more for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Economic
Stimulus act of 2008, see sources cited infra notes 144-147, and many billions more for other bailouts
such as Bear Steams and AIG, see sources cited supra note 115, not to mention the (currently unknown)
needs of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 2008-2009 bailouts alone may be on
the order of a magnitude of some ten to twenty times the size of the roughly $150 billion bailout of the
federal deposit insurance funds in the 1980s. See James R. Barth, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN
DEBACLE 1, 69-79 (1991); sources cited supra notes 15-17; see also Lindsey, Hank Paulson's Fannie
Gamble, supra note 114; Armey, The Fan/Fred Bailout is a Scandal, supra note 113; Bertrand Horwitz,
If IndyMac, Why Not Fannie and Freddie?, WALL ST. J., Aug 7, 2008, at A12 ("Is it possible that the
attention of regulators and Congress can be deflected by lobby size?"); Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.,
Washington Loves Bank Investors, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2008, at A15 (noting that the federal
government is now seeking to protect and reassure private investors because their capital is needed, but
this procedure is an uphill battle with anyone who remembers the government's treatment of thrifts in
the 1980s); Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Why Fannie and Freddie Will Survive (Alas), WALL ST. J., Aug. 27,
2008, at A13 (noting federal efforts to protect some but not all private investors while providing public
financial support to the GSEs); Review & Outlook, When Henry Met Fannie, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2008 at A16; Review & Outlook, Housing Bill Hammers Taxpayers, supra note 114. On the risks of
using public money to bail out private enterprises, see also William Voegeli, Keep the Capitol out of
Capitalism, Rather Than Trying to Fix the Markets, Washington Should Just Lay Down Some Clear
Rules, L.A. TIMES OPINION, July 27, 2008, at M9; Robert Novak, The High Cost of Cronyism,
OKLAHOMAN, July 19, 2008, at 9A; Dick Armey, Congress and the Countrywide Scandal, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 2008, at Al5; and Review & Outlook, Fannie Mae Ugly, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2008, at A10.
There are obvious problems with the fairness of this selective bailout approach. See Tom Brokaw, Lots
of People Could Use a Cash Infusion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at A27. Despite these losses, the
roles of the GSEs and other federally-funded housing programs have been dramatically expanded. See
sources cited supra notes 3, 35-37; Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman & John
P. Holahan, The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 942 (2007); Stephen F.J.
Ornstein, Mathew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman & John P. Holahan, The Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 944 (2007).
119. See sources cited supra notes 15-17; see also Harrell, supra note 97, at 628 n.1 (citing various
commentaries and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA)). Even the Bankruptcy Code was amended to assure that the targets of this effort could not be
relieved of their debts to society. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(33), 523(a)(7), (11)-(13), (19). Today, as noted
below, the public is similarly incensed, but the public policy treatment of insolvent institutions and their
20101 1241
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As noted, things are very different this time.' Fannie and Freddie
continue to operate as giant thrifts, generating the same kinds of
losses that sank the traditional thrift industry in the 1980s; instead of
being shut down, they have received ever-larger federal subsidies and
are being encouraged to expand. 2 2  Over the past three years the
potential cost of Fannie and Freddie has quickly ratcheted, from
assurances of solvency to deficits of $25 billion, $100 billion, then
$200 billion, and finally $400 billion, before becoming officially
unlimited last year; some have estimated that ultimately these
bailouts could increase the U.S. national debt by $1 trillion or
insiders is quite different. While the obligatory federal investigations have begun, see, e.g., Lara Jakes
Jordon, FBI investigates 4 at Core of Collapse, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 24, 2008, at 1B; Thomas M.
Gallagher, Travis P. Nelson & Michael A. Schwartz, Federal Authorities Launch Investigations into the
Subprime Meltdown, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 935 (2007), Fannie and Freddie remain intact and
geared for further expansion; AIG alone was aided at a cost roughly equal to the cost of the entire 1980s
thrift and deposit insurance crisis, see Federal AIG Bailout to Exceed $150B, supra note 116; the Wall
Street Journal urged that insolvent banks be kept afloat with infusions of federal capital rather than
closed, see Review & Outlook, The Paulson Sale, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at Al; the FRB has
extended its supervision (and safety net) to troubled investment banks, see Sudeep Reddy, Bailout Plan
Puts All Eyes on the Fed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A3; other industries lined up for assistance, see
Elizabeth Williamson, Auto Finance Firms Seek a Hand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, at A2; and the
rules governing bank ownership have been loosened rather than tightened, see Peter Lattman & Damian
Paletta, Funds Get Freer Hand in Buying Bank Stakes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at Al; see also
sources cited supra notes 35-37, 116.
120. See sources cited supra notes 15, 17. This is a figure that seems a relative pittance compared to
current bailout efforts, which have been accepted by most of the media with nary a peep. But see Karl
Rove, Voter Anger Is Building over Deficits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2009, at A 19.
121. Compare sources cited supra notes 15-17 with sources cited supra notes 118-119. In fact, we
may be experiencing the beginning of a replay of the 1970s, rather than the 1980s and 1990s, given the
aggressive monetary policy of the past few years. See supra notes 25-29; Guha, Greenspan Warns of
More Bank Bailouts, supra note 114; Westbury, The Fed's Interest Rate Dilemma, supra note 116. As
result, the deposit insurance system may need to be rescued again. See Damian Paletta & Jessica Holzer,
FDIC Weighs Tapping Treasury as Funds Run Low--Short-Term Loans Might be Needed After a Bank
Failure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2008, at All; Marcy Gordon, Bank Failures Take Financial Toll on
FDIC Deposit Insurance Feels Pinch, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 2008, at 3B. Another result will be a
more highly concentrated and heavily-regulated financial system. See Harrell, supra note 8, at 627-28;
Harrell, supra note 78; see also sources cited supra note 118.
122. See sources cited supra note 3; Jenkins, supra note 33 ("In effect, we are reliving the S&L crisis,
with two giant S&Ls gambling on survival with taxpayer funds while politicians summon the will to
act"). The GSEs are not, of course, the only government-sponsored housing and credit-related entities.
There are also federal agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
the FDIC. As noted, these agencies are having their own problems. See Damian Paletta & Jessica
Holzer, FDIC Weighs Tapping Treasury as Funds Run Low-Short-Term Loans Might be Needed After
a Bank Failure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2008 at All; sources cited supra notes 35-37. But as quasi-
private enterprises, the GSEs had a financial structure that was more visible to the public.
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more. 123 In attempting to resuscitate the housing market, the GSEs
have been joined by the FRB, which at the time of this writing has
expanded its liabilities to $2.2 trillion (including over a $1 trillion to
purchase long-term mortgage-related securities); we are now treated
to the spectacle of the FRB acting as a giant government thrift
institution, with all of the risks that entails.' 24 Additionally, in late
2008 Congress created a separate $700 billion bailout fund, which
was used to nationalize (and subsidize) large segments of the
insurance and auto industries. 125 The contrasting treatment of the
affected parties in the 1980s could not be more dramatic.
126
An obvious reason for this difference is that this time federal
policy makers want to expand rather than reduce federal expenditures
and subsidies to various recipients, some of which have been partly
(or wholly) nationalized, in order to target the benefits while
supplying credit in response to the Great Credit Contraction, related
problems in the housing market, and economic problems including
123. See sources cited supra notes 35-37, 105-106, 116-118; James R. Hagerty, Ruth Simon &
Damian Paletta, US. Seizes Mortgage Giants- Government Ousts CEO's of Fannie, Freddie; Promises
up to $200 Billion in Capital, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al. As noted, purely private entities are
also being bailed out; see Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath,
US. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up-
Emergency Loan Effectively Gives Government Control of Insurer; Historic Move Would Cap 10 Days
that Reshaped U.S. Finance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at Al; supra note 116. The bailouts have
shown a marked propensity to grow over time. See sources cited supra notes 35-37, 106; Solomon,
Hagerty & Crittrenden, Strains Mount on Bailout Plans-American Express Gets Quicker Access to U.S.
Cash; Fannie Mae May Need More Help, supra note 112. As noted, the 2008-2009 bail-outs, unlike the
treatment of banks and thrifts in the 1980s, left the rescued institutions and their management largely
intact, simply using federal money to recapitalize the institutions. See sources cited supra note 108, 118,
119; Peter J. Wallison, How Paulson Would Save Fannie Mae, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,2008, at A17.
124. See sources cited supra notes 71, 122, 123. Except, of course, that the FRB essentially
manufactures its own money. But see sources cited supra note 23.
125. See sources cited infra notes 144-147. A primary exception, of course, was Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. See Susanne Craig, Jeffrey McCracken, Jon Hilsenrath & Deborah Solomon, AIG,
Lehman Shock Hits World Markets-Focus Moves to Fate of Giant Insurer After US. Allows Investment
Bank to Fail; Barclay's in Talks to Buy Core Lehman Unit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al.
126. See sources cited supra notes 118, 119. Though it is usual to simply place the blame on such
things as corporate greed and lax oversight, today (as in the 1980s) this has had its share of adherents,
apparently including both 2008 presidential candidates. See Gerald F. Seib, Wall Street's Woes
Challenge Both Candidates, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A6; Review & Outlook, McCain and the
Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A26; Nick Timiraos, Elizabeth Holmes & Michael M. Phillips,
Candidates Promise Broad Changes for Wall Street-McCain and Obama Have Similar Plans to
Address Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17 2008, at A4; Review & Outlook, McCain's Scapegoat, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A22.
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the consequent rise in unemployment. 127  Thus, instead of an
emphasis on preventing another credit bubble, the emphasis is on
seeking to recreate one, for example using targeted federal funding to
re-inflate the housing and credit boom. But the mechanisms in use-
various forms of FRB and taxpayer funding for large, high-profile
institutions-mean that much of the money is being funneled into the
stock market and government-related securities (as well as gold,
commodities, and overseas markets128). The government pumps zero
(or very low) cost funds into large financial institutions, which then
use the money to fund proprietary trading activities, including the
purchase of stocks and government-backed securities. This bolsters
the profitability of these institutions, helps the government fund its
obligations, and creates popular new bubbles in these markets, but so
far has little impact on the broader economy.
These problems have been accompanied by a flight of the domestic
and international capital needed to support U.S. consumer credit
markets and a broader economic recovery. 129 These broader markets
127. See Liam Pleven, Matthew Karnitschnig & Deborah Solomon, U.S. Revamps Bailout of AIG-
Tax-Payers Exposed to Greater Risk in New Plan: $30 Billion More from TARP Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 2009, at Al; Deborah Solomon, Jon Hilsenrath & Damian Paletta, U.S. Plots New Phase in
Banking Bailout, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2009, at Al; Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, supra
note 111; Carrick Mollenkamp, Mark Whitehouse & Neil Shah, Lending Among Banks Freezes, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at Al; Deborah Solomon, Michael Corkery & Liz Rappaport, Mortgage Bailout Is
Greeted With Relief Fresh Questions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at Al; Greg Hitt & Nick Timiraos,
Housing Looms Larger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at A8; Suddep Reddy, The Financial Crisis: Fed
Lent $121 Billion on Week, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A6; Joellen Perry, The Financial Crisis:
Central Banks Pump Out Cash-Fed Sends Dollars to its Foreign Peers in Bid to Pare Rates, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A4; Jon Hilsenrath, The Financial Crisis: Behind the Fed Moves, and What's Next,
WALL ST. J., Sept.19, 2008, at A4. Unfortunately, as noted supra note 2 and infra at notes 128-129, for
many consumers the results have been less than successful. See, e.g., Conor Doughtery, Downturn
Weighs on Poor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2009, at A3; Justin Lahart, Economy Still Bleeding Jobs, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at Al; Reich, supra note 74.
128. See Associated Press, Investors See Gold Upsurge as Shield Against Dollar, OKLAHOMAN, Nov.
12, 2009, at 1B; sources cited supra notes 23-28. Partly as a result, the volatility has spread to foreign
markets. See, e.g., Brian Blackstone, Tom Lauricella & Neil Shak, Global Markets Shudder, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 5, 2010, at Al ; Charles Forelle & Susanne Craig, Debt Deals Haunt Europe, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22, 2010, at Al.
129. See sources cited supra note 128; see also James Grant, Essay, The Confidence Game, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 18, 2008, at W1 (citing a lack of confidence in federal financial policies); Holman W. Jenkins,
Jr., Are We Running Out of Rescue Cash?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A25; Tom Lauricella, Liz
Rappaport & Annelena Lobb, Mounting Fears Shake World Markets as Banking Giants Rush to Raise
Capital, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al, A14; Solomon, Corkery & Rappaport, Mortgage Bailout Is
Greeted With Relief Fresh Questions, supra note 127. The need to attract international capital ultimately
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remain largely frozen, impervious to federal funding efforts focused
on subsidies to a few large entities. 130 These broader markets are
more dependent on private capital and the routine enforceability of
credit contracts and mortgage liens, an issue put in doubt by the
public policy assaults on subprime consumer lending.
131
Thus, the 2008-2009 solutions have failed to address the issues
and problems created by the countervailing restrictions (at both state
and federal levels) on subprime mortgage lending. 132 In effect, the
consumer credit system has become a bottleneck that fails to pass
through federal monetary and fiscal stimuli to the broader economy.
As a result, the 2008-2009 stimulus and bailout efforts have largely
failed to resuscitate the economy.' 33 The large public expenditures,
institutional bailouts, subsidies on an unprecedented scale, and
massively accommodative FRB monetary policy 134 have avoided the
may place constraints on domestic political considerations. See Zachary Karabell, America and the New
Financial World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at A19; Jeff Bater, Foreigners Buy Fewer U.S. Assets-Net
Purchases in October Came in at $8.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at C8.
130. See sources cited supra note 127; see also sources cited supra notes 35-37, 118-123; Review &
Outlook, The Next Bailout: Detroit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2008, at A14 (noting the 2008 plans of
Detroit automaker to seek federal funding of roughly $40 billion, and summarizing the corporate and
prospective federal agency bailouts apparent to that date in 2008, including the FDIC (amount
unknown), Bear Steams ($29 billion), HUD and the FHA ($350 billion), the student loan program
(amount unknown), FHA Secure (up to $50 billion), and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac (now estimated at
$200 billion, or more)). To this was added the $700 billion bailout for Wall Street and other financial
institutions. See Herszenhorn, supra note 117, at 1. Then there is the increase in the AIG bailout to $150
billion or more and subsidies to the auto industry and others. See sources cited supra note 116. Then
there is the $2 trillion-plus FRB balance sheet, and the subtle subsidy to the major banks that are
borrowing from the FRB for almost nothing and relending to the Treasury at a healthy margin. See
sources cited supra notes 71-73, 104, 122-123; Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Obama vs. the Banks, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A27. The implications go well beyond the potential for increased demands on
taxpayers. See Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Washington Is Quietly Repudiating Its Debts, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2008, at A15; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Are We Running Out of Rescue Cash?, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2008, at A25; David Broder, Staggering Deficit Provides a Sobering Dose of Reality,
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 15, 2008, at 10A; sources cited supra note 112. And, so far at least, it has simply
not worked to revive the private credit markets. See Driscoll, supra; David Streitfeld, Rates Are Low,
But Banks Balk at Refinancing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at 1; Forbes, supra note 107, at 16; sources
cited supra note 127.
131. See supra Part I.B.7.
132. See supra Part I.B.7.
133. See sources cited supra notes 25, 33, 107, 111-112, 129, 130; Vernon L. Smith, There's No Easy
Way out of the Bubble, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at A17.
134. See sources cited supra notes 111-112, 114-116, 130; Manuel Hinds, It's Time for Banks to Put
Their Chips on the Table, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at A15 (noting huge injections of liquidity by the
FRB).
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risks of a systemic liquidity crisis that threatened the banking
system, 135 but have not prevented the Great Credit Contraction, or the
resulting recession, or addressed related problems in the housing,
credit, and mortgage markets.
136
As noted, this is because the 2008-2009 stimulus efforts are
largely misdirected and fail to address the fundamental problems
afflicting the economy and the credit markets: an unworkable system
of consumer protection laws, and a lack of confidence in the
enforceability of consumer credit contracts and mortgage liens. We
finally have reached a tipping point: the regulatory, statutory, and
judicial restraints on origination and enforcement of consumer debts
and mortgage liens have overcome the basic strengths of the U.S.
legal system, so as to impair confidence in the American rule of law.
The result has been a flight of capital from U.S. mortgage markets,
directly related to the onerous consumer protection laws and
regulations directed at subprime home mortgage lending. 137 This is
the culmination of a trend dating back some forty years, consisting of
an ever-increasing umbrella of complex federal consumer protection
laws and regulations being imposed on top of an unworkable
patchwork of non-uniform state laws. 138 In the past few years this
trend accelerated, first in response to the 1993-2006 expansion of
consumer credit and then in response to its contraction, and in fact
135. See Deborah Solomon, Liz Rappaport, Damian Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath, Shock Forced
Paulson's Hand-A Black Wednesday on Credit Markets; 'Heaven Help us All', WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2008, at Al; see also sources cited supra notes 111-112, 114-116, 130; Deborah Solomon, Damian
Paletta & Greg Hitt, US. Seals Bailout Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al.
136. See Ruth Simon & Michael Corkery, Problem of Home Prices Remains, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
2008, at A3; Peter S. Goodman, But Will It All Work?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at 1; Justin Lahart,
Timothy Aeppel & Conor Dougherty, Credit Crisis Darkens US. Outlook, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008,
at A8; Michael Corkery, Housing's Biggest Woes Are Left Untreated, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at
A14; see also sources cited supra notes 2, 111-116, 130. Public officials seem perplexed and unsure
what to do next. See supra note 13; Tom Raum, Analysis: Officials Running Out of Solutions,
OKLAHOMAN, July 16, 2008, at 3B ("The nation's leaders are running out of answers to America's
economic crisis.").
137. See supra Part I.B.7; see also Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97, at 567-69. Indeed, some
of the proposals urged and solutions adopted in response to the current crisis may make things worse, for
example, by discouraging extensions of consumer credit and suggesting an intent to increasingly impair
the legal rights of mortgage creditors. See discussion below, including sources cited infra notes 141-166
and accompanying text.
138. See sources cited supra note 137.
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THE GREAT CREDIT CONTRACTION
there was a surge in such measures after the Great Credit Contraction
began in 2007, with both state and federal laws and regulations
becoming even more onerous from the perspective of consumer
mortgage lending. 139 This is a prescription for a credit crisis and an
economic contraction, even as the FRB has pumped unprecedented
funding into the system and major institutions have received massive
bailouts and subsidies. The result has been a world-wide loss of
confidence in the enforceability of U.S. credit contracts, in the midst
of a stock market boom and near-zero interest rates, a dramatic
reversal from our previous economic history.
Sadly, the Great Credit Contraction and related economic problems
are largely self-inflicted injuries, resulting from misguided consumer
credit laws and regulations (in conjunction with monetary policy
errors and federal housing policy), that have created an untenable
legal environment for residential mortgage transactions. 140 Moreover,
legal non-uniformity and interference with judicial remedies at the
state level have increased dramatically. 141  Together, these
developments significantly discourage home mortgage lending and
investment, acting as a counter to efforts of the FRB and policy
makers to reinvigorate the housing and credit markets. 142 And, as
139. See sources cited supra note 3. See also sources cited supra note 137; supra Part I.B.7; sources
cited supra notes 78, 98-99. A review of any recent Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services
Law, in The Business Lawyer or any issue of the Consumer Finance Law Quarterly Report will amply
illustrate this point. For merely one example, regulation under the federal Truth in Lending Act has gone
well beyond its original purpose requiring truthful disclosure, to embrace onerous substantive consumer
protection provisions with extensive restrictions backed by severe sanctions. See sources cited infra
notes 143-146. Of course, in this respect, the FRB is merely reflecting the will of Congress, as it is
essentially required to do. But that does not fix the problem.
140. See Stephen F.J. Omstein, Matthew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman & John P. Holahan, The Current
Residential Mortgage Market Landscape in the United States, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 891 (2007)
(describing many of the measures noted here); Stephen F.J. Ornstein & Matthew S. Yoon, Update on
Federal Anti-Predatory Lending Legislative Efforts, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 620 (2007). See also
sources cited supra note 3.
141. See Donald C. Lampe, Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, Introduction to the 2009 Annual
Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 64 Bus. LAW. 465, 467 (2009); Amir Efrati, Foreclosure
Challenges Raise Questions About Judicial Role, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2009, at Al 5.
142. See; Guha, Greenspan Warns of More Bank Bail-Outs, supra note 114; sources cited supra note
71. See also Harrell, supra note 97; Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Defends Policy of Low Rates, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 23, 2008, at A3. This has obvious implications for bank management, which may believe there
is good reason for caution and has a fiduciary duty to protect the assets of the bank. The result is a
simple credit crunch. See Streitfeld, supra notes 112, 130. As noted, the subsequent policy responses
probably are making things worse. See Review & Outlook, Banker Baiting 101, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
20101
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noted again below, many of the current "solutions" are making
matters even worse. 1
4 3
2009, at A20. See also sources cited supra note 3. In addition, there is apparently some tension between
banking regulators that favor increased credit liberality and the FDIC, which is responsible for the
consequences. Peter A. McKay, FDIC Presses Bank Regulators to Use Warier Eye-Dow Slides 180.51
as Fannie, Freddie Drag Down Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2008, at C1. In addition, it has been
argued that similar pressures to expand lending may have contributed to the current crisis. See George
Will, More Corporate Welfare?, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 21, 2008, at 14A ("Politics produced Fannie
Mae."); Review & Outlook, Fannie Mae's Patron Saint, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2008, at A24; Harrell,
supra note 97, at 628; Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97, at 563-64. Others have noted the similar
effects of related mandates, such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), in creating the current
crisis. See supra Part I.B.4; Charles Krauthammer, Whatever It Takes, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 26, 2008, at
8A ("It lies at the root of our current calamity."); Review & Outlook, A Mortgage Fable, WALL. ST. J.,
Sept. 22, 2008, at A22 (listing the CRA as one of the federal policies promoting easy mortgage credit
and contributing to the 2008 "meltdown," along with FRB monetary policy; Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac; the "credit-rating oligopoly," banking regulators; and corporate bailouts such as the "Bear Steams
rescue."). And, of course, there will always be a role for irresponsibility driven by greed and short-term
expediency. Given the obvious role of lax credit standards in contributing to the current problems, it is
legitimate to question whether it is appropriate for federal policy and regulation to provide further
incentives for such behavior. Still, that has been a part of federal policy for many years. See id; supra
Parts Il.B.2, 3, 4,6.
143. See Kara Scannell, Phred Dvorak, Joann S. Lublin & Elizabeth Williamson, Rescue Plan Stirs
Calls for Deeper Regulation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at Al; Bob Davis, Damian Paletta & Rebecca
Smith, Unraveling Reagan: Amid Turmoil, US. Turns Away from Decades of Deregulation, WALL ST.
J., July 25, 2008, at Al. As noted, this apparently included both 2008 presidential candidates. See supra
note 126; Nick Timiraos, Elizabeth Holmes & Michael M. Phillips, Candidates Promise Broad Changes
for Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A4. Indeed, the consistent "stimulus" policies throughout
2008-2009 can be fairly called bipartisan, differing largely in the amounts (and in some cases the
identity of the recipients). Because of this basic consistency, it is fair to describe the current approach as
the Bush-Paulson-Bemanke-Obama-Geithner program. It is appropriate to note again that many of these
measures significantly constrain credit availability and/or increase the scope of the potential public
liability for private financial losses and that this is a sharp reversal from the financial reforms of the
1980s and 1990s, which generally were intended to enhance private credit availability and reduce public
liabilities in response to the deposit insurance crises of that period. See sources cited supra notes 3, 118-
119; Harrell, supra note 4, at 628. See also supra notes 15, 17. As noted above, the Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008 alone could cost taxpayers half a trillion to one trillion dollars or even more. See sources
cited supra notes 116-118, 128-130. More recent initiatives conceivably could double this cost. See
Herszenhom, supra note 9. Other proposals, such as that from the Treasury to encourage banks to issue
so-called "covered bonds" (which may effectively bring the assets sold and securitized by banks within
the umbrella of federal deposit insurance, which is already strained) may create even more public
liabilities. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, US. Pushes a European Model to Help Banks Make Home
Loans-'Covered Bonds' May Lure Investors Wary of Defaults, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at A3;
Review & Outlook, Mr. Paulson's New Bonds, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2008, at A14; Paletta & Holzer,
FDIC Weighs Tapping Treasury as Funds Run Low-Short-Term Loans Might be Needed After a Bank
Failure, supra note 121; see also sources cited supra notes 35-37, 142; infra Part 1H.
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III. RECENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. 2008-2009 Legislation and Regulations
In 2008-2009 the American economy was literally flooded with
additional state and federal policy measures directed at consumer
mortgage credit. Among these, 144 the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
increased the GSE lending limits while extending federal guaranties
to cover their liabilities, and provided $350 billion more for FHA
lending programs as well as other subsidies for assorted federal
programs. 145 This was followed by the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), 146 and later by the $700 billion
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.147 A stated purpose
of such measures was to resuscitate mortgage lending, which sharply
contracted beginning in 2007, resulting in a larger credit crunch.I
4 8
Almost simultaneously, however, a barrage of other state and
federal requirements was being implemented for the apparent purpose
of reducing the availability of subprime mortgage credit. 149 As noted
above, examples include regulatory initiatives such as the
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, the
Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending,' 50 and the
144. See Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 141, at 468; Julie R. Caggiano, Theresa G. Franz~n &
Jennifer L. Dozier, Mortgage and Predatory Lending Law Developments, 64 Bus. LAW. 517 (2009).
145. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008); see also sources
cited supra note 143. See generally Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman & John
P. Holahan, The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 942 (2007); Caggiano,
Franz6n & Dozier, supra note 144.
146. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat 2654 (2008). See
generally Ornstein, Yoon, Tallman & Holahan, The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 61
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 944 (2007).
147. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
148. See sources cited supra notes 1-3, 111-142. The discussion below also notes some of the risks of
these measures.
149. See Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 144, at 468; sources cited supra note 148. In addition to
these sources and the discussion below, see Caggiano, Franz n & Dozier, supra note 144; Richard E.
Gottlieb & Andrew McGuinness, Subprime Lending as Public Nuisance: Casting Blame Mortgage on
Lenders and Wall Street for Inner City Blight, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4 (2008); Lynette
Hotchkiss, A Loan by Any Other Name- The Advent of the "Rate Spread" Home Loan, 62 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP 653; Lynette Hotchkiss & Sharon L. Bangert, Broker Beware, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 87 (2008); Harrell, supra note 97, at 630-31; Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97, at 567-69.
150. See Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 143, at 468. See, e.g., Stephen F.J. Ornstein & Matthew
S. Yoon, Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products Risks, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
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FRB's 2008 revisions to Regulation Z, 151 all intended to curtail
predatory practices but also having an adverse effect on legitimate
subprime mortgage lending. 152 These federal measures were imposed
on top of an expanding range of state "anti-predatory lending" laws
that had the same effect; 153 and, when these laws and regulations
succeeded in restricting subprime credit availability and left
consumers unable to refinance or buy homes, housing demand and
prices sagged, and ultimately foreclosures surged. 154 Some states and
courts then responded with measures designed to impede
foreclosure, 155 which again made this problem worse. 156 State and
federal laws and regulations that impose fiduciary-like duties on
mortgage lenders to protect borrowers are another example, which
have the effect of encouraging borrowers to default and then blame
their lender. 157 It is not clear why policy makers think that imposing
these onerous new burdens, legal risks, compliance and litigation
costs and liabilities on creditors, and restrictions on the origination
and enforcement of mortgage loans will enhance the availability and
affordability of credit.1 58 In addition, the interference with judicial
REP. 161 (2007); Stephen F.J. Ornstein, David A. Tallman & John P. Holahan, Interagency Statement on
Subprime Mortgage Lending, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 176 (2007).
151. See Caggiano, Franz~n & Dozier, supra note 144; Hotchkiss, supra note 148; Hotchkiss &
Bangert, supra note 149.
152. See sources cited supra notes 148-150. See also Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 144, at
468; Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman & John P. Holahan, Final Rule
Amending the Home Mortgage Provisions of Regulation Z, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 932 (2007);
Stephen F.J. Ornstein & Matthew S. Yoon, Proposed FRB Mortgage Lending Regulations, 61
CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 616 (2007). While some maintain that predatory lending caused the current
crisis, others have responded that there is no evidence to support this. See, e.g., Krauthammer, supra
note 142 ("Were there some predatory lenders? Of course. But only a fool or a demagogue ... would
suggest that this is a major part of the problem.").
153. See supra Part I.B.7; sources cited supra note 144 and infra note 158.
154. See Constance Mitchell Ford, Foreclosures Continue to Put a Damper on Home Prices, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A6; The Year in Foreclosures, supra note 2; sources cited supra note 1-3, 107-
109.
155. See Symposium, Debt Collection, Mortgage Law, and Foreclosure, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 221 (2009); Efrati, supra note 141.
156. See Aaron Byrkit, Reforming Mortgage Disposition: A Tool for Tempering the Financial
Meltdown, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 275, 276-77 (2009).
157. See Bennet S. Koren, Suitability and HOEPA, 61 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 201 (2007).
158. See e.g., Harrell, supra note 78. See also Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 97, at 567-69;
State Law Developments, 61 CONSUMER FN. L.Q. REP. 390 (2007); Fred H. Miller, Jeffrey I. Langer,
Donald C. Lampe & Alvin C. Harrell, Introduction to the 2007 Annual Survey of Consumer Financial
Services Law, 62 BUS. LAw. 553 (2007); sources cited supra note 109.
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processes and standards in some states has cast doubt on the basic
rule of law, undermining the legal pillars of mortgage credit. 59 It
takes only a few such developments (along with the seemingly
inevitable political posturing that accompanies such measures) to
impair confidence in an entire credit system. Moreover, once the
damage has been done it is not easy to repair. No wonder private
mortgage finance has all but collapsed, despite federal spending and
credit programs of such magnitude as to create a new range of
additional problems and financial bubbles.16
0
All of this has largely escaped public and media notice. 16 1 Perhaps
there is a natural tendency to ignore facts that don't support one's
policy agenda, and perhaps only specialized lawyers can fully
comprehend the impact of technical changes in the law, for instance,
on investment and loan underwriting decisions. 162 Financial analysts
are likely to view these larger issues as a matter of, well, financial
analysis, so there may be a tendency to view the Great Credit
Contraction as purely another financial development, for example, a
shortage of liquidity,' 63 leading to an emphasis on monetary policy
solutions that impair the value of the dollar without reviving the
private mortgage markets.' 
64
159. See Victor Cholewicki, There's a Huge Price for Violating Mortgage Contracts, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 7, 2008, at A26; Efrati, supra note 141; Gottlieb & McGuinness, supra note 148; Stephen F.J.
Ornstein, Matthew S. Yoon, David A. Tallman, Richard B. Horn & John P. Holahan, Massachusetts
Sues Fremont, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 716 (2007); Damian Paletta, Jessica Holzer & Ruth Simon,
U.S. Steps Up Help for Homeowners, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at A3 (noting Congressional
proposal for a moratorium on foreclosures). See also sources cited supra note 109.
160. See Associated Press, Economists Warn of Slow Pending, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 16, 2009, at 3B;
Henry Kaufman, The Real Threat to Fed Independence, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A2 1; Review &
Outlook, The Fannie Mae Dice Roll Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20; sources cited supra
notes 1-3.
161. Compare the preferred emphasis on solutions dependent on increased regulation and federal
expenditures, as cited supra notes 118-130. See also sources cited supra notes 71, 86.
162. See supra notes 149, 150; Harrell, supra note 78.
163. See sources cited supra notes 114-143. This would explain the emphasis on monetary solutions,
and why this hasn't worked. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1-3.
164. See sources cited supra notes 1-3, 114-143; supra Part I.B.2; see also George Will, A Gold
Standard on US. Debt, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 12, 2009, at 10A (noting world-wide concerns with the
declining value of the U.S. currency).
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B. Federal Legislation and Proposals165
As suggested above, the Great Credit Contraction began partly as
the cyclical consequence of a financial bubble created by volatile
FRB monetary policies and federal housing subsidies, but was
reinforced by ill-timed crackdowns on subprime lending that cut-off
access to credit for many consumers at the worst possible point in the
economic cycle. What is wholly different this time is the way that
subsequent policy responses make it more likely that the Great Credit
Contraction will continue for years to come and will effectively
preclude the economy from a normal recovery. These responses have
created bottlenecks in the credit system, assuring that federal
monetary and fiscal stimulus efforts will be largely ineffective,
except possibly (as noted) to create new asset bubbles in stock and
commodities prices. 166 A few examples are noted below.
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007,
introduced by Representative Barney Frank and passed by the U.S.
House of Representatives on November 15, 2007,167 and the Home
Ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007, introduced by
Senator Christopher Dodd on December 12, 2007,168 are prime
examples of the damage that can be done by mere proposals. Just as
the credit and housing markets were collapsing, these bills sought to
further restrict and discourage mortgage lending. 169 The Emergency
Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act 170 and the
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008171 were even worse,
172
165. See generally Omstein et al., supra note 140 (describing many of the proposals noted here).
166. See Judy Shelton, The Fed's Woody Allen Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at A25; Joanna
Slater, William Mallard & Bob Davis, World Tries to Buck Up Dollar-Thailand, Korea, Russia Seen
Buying US. Currency; Pressure on China to Boost Yuan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at Al; sources
cited supra notes 23-28, 37, 42, 71, 74, 106, 111.
167. H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007). See generally Caggiano, Franz~n & Dozier, supra note 144, at
5 17-524 (discussing federal policy responses to the Great Credit Contraction).
168. S. 2452, 110th Cong. (2007).
169. Caggiano, Franz~n & Dozier, supra note 144; see also Stephen F.J. Omstein & Matthew S.
Yoon, Update on Federal Anti-Predatory Lending Legislative Effort, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 620
(2007); Harrell, supra note 97, at 630-31.
170. H.R. 3609, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
171. S.2636, 110th Cong. (2008).
172. See Ornstein & Yoon, supra note 169; see also Caggiano, Franzdn & Dozier, sources cited supra
notes 3, 144.
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responding to the foreclosure crisis by proposing to allow debtors to
"cram down" home mortgage liens in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases,
unilaterally rewriting the mortgage contract by reducing the mortgage
lien to the depressed value of the home. 173 Obviously, this would
overturn the traditional legal structure and the economic bargain for
mortgage lenders and investors.
174
Probably not everyone agrees with this assessment, and perhaps
some would respond that this is just the way things work in
Washington, D.C. But there can be little doubt that the value of
homes widely "crashed," and private credit availability
simultaneously dried up in the Great Credit Contraction that
accompanied serious consideration of these measures. 175 There is also
little doubt that, in a period of dramatic declines in housing prices,
many borrowers would like to rewrite their mortgage contracts to
reduce their creditors' mortgage liens and alter other property rights,
and that elimination of the "anti-modification" clause in Bankruptcy
Code section 1322(b)(2) (which protects home mortgage liens from
modification in Chapter 13 cases) is a prime prospect for
accomplishing that wish. 176 Indeed, who among us would not like to
do this very thing?
But the real question is not whether consumers would like to have,
essentially, free money and a one-sided mortgage relationship (for
example, if housing prices go up, the borrower wins; if they go down,
the creditor loses). The real concern should be the effect that the
prospects for such a legal environment has on the cost and
availability of private mortgage credit (and housing values). Industry
representatives commonly argue that allowing a cram-down of home
mortgage liens would significantly increase the cost of mortgage
173. Ornstein & Yoon, supra note 169, at 624; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (current
Bankruptcy Code provision precluding such modifications).
174. Ornstein & Yoon, supra note 169. The proposal also would allow the bankruptcy court to modify
other terms of the parties' contract, such as the payment amount and interest rate. Compare this with the
analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), and Nobelman
v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
175. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 569-70 (8th ed. 2009) (describing
"The 2007 Home Loan Crisis"); sources cited supra notes 1-3.
176. See sources cited supra note 175.
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credit (and possibly down payment requirements as well), 177 as
lenders and creditors would discount the value of mortgage liens to
reflect the potential for further losses during inevitable housing
cycles.'
78
This debate was renewed with vigor in 2007, as the Great Credit
Contraction began and prospects were presented for shifting
additional enormous losses from consumers to mortgage holders.
179
This very debate, and the likely prospect (given the make-up of
Congress and the political environment) that advocates of home
mortgage cram-downs could prevail, probably contributed to the
housing crisis and Great Credit Contraction by causing lenders,
investors and other creditors to withdraw capital from the housing
and credit markets, just as a cyclical downturn was already
beginning. In effect, these kinds of public policy initiatives helped
turn a cyclical downturn into the Great Credit Contraction.
Of course, not everyone agrees with this assessment. Some
commentators have analogized this scenario to a previous brief
period, 180 when some courts were allowing cram-downs of mortgage
liens under various theories (before that was limited by the United
States Supreme Courtl 81), for example concluding that this "empirical
evidence ... suggests that interest rates did not materially rise during
the 15-year period in which [section] 1322(b)(2) was effectively
gutted in several circuits by the 'bifurcation' theory eventually
177. See, e.g.,WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 175 (estimating an increase of one to one and a half or
more in interest rates). Your author considers this to be an overly conservative estimate.
178. Id.; see also Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the importance of
protecting home mortgage liens in order to encourage the "flow of capital into the home lending
market").
179. Although nominally such losses are shared by both borrowers and creditors, in reality the
financial losses suffered by creditors far exceed those suffered by borrowers. Given the minimal down
payment requirements of recent years, see WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 175, almost the entire
financial loss comes from the creditor's investment. As to any deficiency in the debt owed, many states
have anti-deficiency statutes that protect borrowers in these circumstances, and in any event many such
borrowers are financially judgment-proof and/or can discharge the liability in bankruptcy. This is not to
downplay the emotional trauma imposed on homeowners when there is a credit contraction and housing
market collapse, but this emotion should not obscure the financial consequences. See, e.g., Byrkit, supra
note 156, at 278-280.
180. Basically the time between the decisions in Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d
1304 (3d Cir. 1989), and Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
181. See Gaglia, 889 F.2d 1304; Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410; see also Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324.
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rejected by Nobelman in 1993. ''182 In your author's experience, this
window of legal uncertainty was even narrower, 183 and coincided
with the previous credit and housing crisis (in the late 1980s and
early 1990s), which was much like the current one. 184 This reinforces,
rather than disproves, your author's observations here about the
adverse impact of bankruptcy cram-downs on mortgage credit costs
and availability. It is not too much to note that the credit and housing
boom of 1993-2006 began only after Dewsnup and Nobelman
resolved these issues in a manner consistent with traditional legal
principles, rejecting the Gaglia analysis allowing such cram-downs,
and that the end of the boom coincided with a renewed debate on
these issues and the introduction of new cram-down legislation.
185
Obviously, other significant factors were also at work,186 but it is
surely more than coincidence that the promise of judicial and policy
initiatives designed to impair mortgage liens and the enforcement of
credit contracts has coincided with periods of reduced credit
availability and declining housing values. Indeed, the relation is so
dramatic, and apparent, that one can only marvel at attempts to ignore
or deny it.
Obviously, and as noted above, proposed cram-down legislation is
not the only such factor contributing to the Great Credit
Contraction. 187 But in conjunction with other efforts-state and
federal-to crack down on subprime mortgage lending,' 88 and
responses to the rise in foreclosures that have included impediments
on traditional foreclosure remedies, 189 these policy initiatives have
created a new legal environment that calls into question the routine
enforceability of mortgage loan contracts and liens. Given that
182. WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 175, at 566.
183. See sources cited supra note 180.
184. See supra Parts I.B.2-5.
185. See sources cited supra notes 173-184.
186. See supra Parts I.B.2-5.
187. See also sources cited supra note 3; supra Part I.B.
188. For examples, see Richard A. Vance, Mortgage Lending Variations in the Bluegrass Nation:
Kentucky Sweeping Mortgage Lending Bill, 62 CONSUMER FrN. L.Q. REP. 117 (2008); Ornstein et al.,
supra note 140; sources cited supra note 3.
189. See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008), noted in WARREN &
BUSSEL, supra note 175, at 570; and Ornstein et al., Massachusetts Sues Fremont, supra note 159.
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mortgage lending and other types of credit, as creatures of the law,
are dependent on confidence in the enforceability of contracts and
liens, it is not difficult to recognize that current policy measures are
scaring away the private investment and credit needed to support
healthy credit markets. 190 This is particularly true for mortgage
markets, where the traditionally low interest rates and extended loan
terms are viable for private capital only in the absence of significant
legal and monetary risk.
Publicly denouncing creditors and impairing creditors' rights and
remedies may be popular with the media and some members of the
public, but are not helpful in attracting the capital needed for
smoothly functioning credit markets. These markets have been
essential to western capitalism for centuries. The recent public
posturing and mismanagement of credit and financial policies have
now called this system into question, in the process shaking
confidence in the viability of contracts and property law and even the
rule of law itself. This cannot be done without adversely affecting the
interests of ordinary citizens and consumers.191
This is part of an overall pattern that includes the effective
nationalization of mortgage finance through: Fannie and Freddie; an
expanding role for the FHA; massive subsidies for large, high profile
institutions; the expansion of FDIC insurance liability; 192 pressures
on bank management to expand credit; 193 and the arrangements
between the U.S. Treasury and the FRB to monetize the public debt
and have the FRB expand its balance sheet to maintain funding for
mortgage finance. 194 The result is that an entirely new federal system
190. See sources cited supra notes 1-3.
191. See sources cited supra notes 1-3,109, 127.
192. See sources cited supra notes 118-119, 143. On the risks of expanding federal deposit insurance,
see also Alan S. Blinder & R. Glenn Hubbard, Blanket Deposit Insurance Is a Bad Idea, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 2008, at A17.
193. See, e.g., Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Defends Policy of Low Rates, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2008, at
A3; Review & Outlook, The Senate's Bankers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25 2008, at A 12. This is not limited to
the Obama administration. The U.S. Treasury Department's 2007 "Blueprint" for financial reform
sought to significantly centralize the laws governing payments, insurance, securities transactions, etc.
See, e.g., Meghan Stringer Musselman, U.S. Treasury Department Plan for the Overhaul of Financial
Institution Regulation, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 847 (2007).
194. See Review & Outlook, Secretary of the Fed, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at A14; Paul, supra
note 105; sources cited supra notes 112-142; Lampe, Miller & Harrell, supra note 141, at 470.
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of mortgage finance has been created to displace the private funding
mechanisms impaired by recent changes in state and federal law:
housing sales are promoted by paying first-time buyers to buy a
house; the loans are originated by a handful of federally-subsidized
banks; the loans are sold to federally-owned and funded GSEs
(Fannie and Freddie); and the resulting mortgage-backed securities
are purchased by the FRB (to the tune of over $1 trillion so far).1
95
The mortgage credit system has been essentially nationalized, in a
period of only about eighteen months, as a substitute for the pre-
existing private mortgage markets. The public costs are estimated in
the trillions, yet foreclosures continue at record levels.' 
96
Obviously these measures create a new consumer dependency on
the federal government for mortgage finance, 197 and probably reflect
a bias (or at least a lack of understanding) on the part of some policy
makers,' 98 resulting in simultaneous efforts to restrict private
subprime lending and expand taxpayer-funded alternatives. 199 As a
consequence, the basic role of the United States mortgage and credit
markets (and the national currency) have been put at risk,2°0 without
providing a solution to the Great Credit Contraction. Through it all,
no public figure seems cognizant of the issues and the dangers they
pose to all consumers.
CONCLUSION
The causes and effects of the Great Credit Contraction are
undoubtedly complex and subtle, and seem to have escaped the
195. See sources cited supra note 194.
196. WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 175, at 570; see also Constance Mitchell Ford, Foreclosures
Continue to Put a Damper on Home Prices, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A6; sources cited supra
notes 35-37, 103.
197. See sources cited supra notes 192-196; see also Bob Davis, Damian Paletta & Rebecca Smith,
Unraveling Reagan: Amid Turmoil, U.S. Turns Away from Decades of Deregulation, WALL ST. J., July
25, 2008, at Al.
198. See sources cited supra notes 192-196; see Raun, Analysis: Officials Running Out of Solutions,
supra note 136; sources cited supra note 114.
199. See sources cited supra notes 142-166 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra
notes 1-3, 35-37, 118-119.
200. See sources cited supra note 199; see also Review & Outlook, A Dollar Warning from Asia,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A24 ("This is a dangerous game .... ).
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attention of the domestic media and many policy makers. 2" As a
result, the policy responses have been largely ineffective, or even
counterproductive, with further costs that appear likely to be
damaging in the future, perhaps in unprecedented ways. 2°2 No matter
what these consequences ultimately entail, they are not likely to
include the broad public participation in the credit system and
housing markets that were features of the traditional American
system of private finance that was so readily cast aside.
201. Though not the world. See Review & Outlook, supra note 200.
202. Id.; see also sources cited supra notes 5, 7, 23, 25, 33, 37, 40-42, 71, 73, 78, 87, 88, 101, 107,
111-121; Steve H. Hanke & David Ransom, The Fed and the Price of Rice, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2008,
at A17 (noting the correlation between FRB monetary policy and the 2008 commodities bubble);
Review & Outlook, Run on Washington, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2008, at A14 (predicting a global "run"
on the dollar and U.S. economy due to declining confidence in U.S. financial policies); George Melloan,
Inflation and the Bush Legacy, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2008, at A15 (noting the adverse effects of
inflation).
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